


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29 SEPTEMBER 1988

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JPRS Report



Soviet Union

Military Affairs

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Soviet Union

Military Affairs

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'Dedovshchina' Leads to Murder

18010275a Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 29 Jul 88 p 2

[Article by M. Melnik, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
Special Correspondent: "An Incident in a Spezvagon"]

[Text] The regularly scheduled train arrived at one of the Leningrad stations early one frozen morning. Internal Forces soldiers jumped out of the dark green car and stretched their legs on the platform along the long road. They had carried out their missions and had delivered convicts to very, very remote locations. And now they were returning "home." But no one came out of one of the cars. The warrant officer from the next wagon who had noticed an empty pane in the broken window shouted, "Where is the guard?" No one answered him and the warrant officer ordered someone to see what was going on there. A minute later the soldier returned in shock. He had seen something frightening—the entire guard detail, seven soldiers and a civilian conductor, had been shot at pointblank range.

Detachments of armed policemen quickly appeared at Leningrad intersections.

And several hours later the city learned the name of the killer. The photograph of a private was shown on television. For reasons that will soon be clear to the reader we will only give his first name—Artur. The chief of the oblast criminal investigation section stated, "The killer must not get away! He is armed and very dangerous."

Two days passed. Artur was seen on a regularly scheduled bus. Two policemen rushed after him through the overcrowded Ikarusa showroom. Despite expectations, he did not put up any resistance when he was arrested.

"Greetings, my love. My active duty has begun. A week ago I was a "salaga" [not further defined] and today I am a soldier able to defend not only my own Motherland, but my own home and you."

This is the letter that construction technical school graduate Artur wrote to his girlfriend two months after he was called up for service in the Internal Forces. Artur had been raised in a family dormitory (his parents obtained separate quarters only a few years ago). They had lived in cramped quarters and Artur dreamed of building houses that were comfortable, well-lit and spacious.

Everyone felt that Artur's family was generally successful. His father was an NII [Scientific Research Institute] lathe operator and his mother was deputy section chief at one of the institutions. Artur had not caused his parents any special problems and cares. He was attracted to history and modern music and trained for military service. He especially liked taking books about the army out of the library. And letters full of optimism flew home

in the initial days after his call-up. But then his preparations in the training subunit were over. Artur was sent to another unit and there his mood changed radically.

He most of all disliked the relationships that had developed in the subunit. Do you know what the term "make the deer" means? This was a punishment that people who have been in the army longer give to the "new man" for minor transgressions. The guilty party covered his forehead with his hands and the others beat him hard enough to make his head buzz for hours.

Private Oleg Solodkov told the investigator, "I remember how they kicked Artur in the barracks. I wanted to break it up, but they warned me. 'Interfere and you will get it.' It is not difficult to explain why they beat our hero more than everyone else. Artur was not very physically developed and could not strike back. But he had character. These "dedushki" [old-timers] would tell him to clean their shoes and he would refuse. He would even fly off the handle and snap back. This was how they 'trained' him."

Our private went to the command more than once asking that he be transferred to another company, a construction company. They planned to fulfill his request and there were only three days until his transfer orders came in.

Private Rozhanskas, one of Artur's colleagues, remembers, "He did not want to go on this last trip. He came to me all upset and said in a fury, 'Again with them...' Assigned to go with Artur on that guard detail were precisely those soldiers who had been most zealous in 'educating' him."

He decided that the best thing he could do was not get involved with anything and not answer back.

The senior sergeant, deputy chief of the guard detail, immediately "explained the situation." "The warrant officer and the conductor are asleep and we will go to sleep as well.. You, young man, will work." Artur took his post. He was to have been relieved in two hours, but no relief came in two hours, in six hours or in ten hours. He then returned to the cabin where he was met with disapproving laughter. He was struck once, then again, then hit again with an iron key. Artur felt blood flowing down his ear.

His heart was filled with resentment, but nonetheless sleep overtook him. The cry "comrades" shook the guard compartment several instances later. They woke Artur up in this manner. They put a bundle of papers between his toes and lit it. This was called the "bicycle."

Artur again trudged along to his post. This was the first time he had violated guard duty requirements—he sat with his back to the convicts. He was embarrassed by his tears.

Convict Yelin who had been in that special car remembers, "One fellow stood out from the entire group of servicemen. He was often beaten. I twice traveled with that fellow as guard and they taunted him that last trip. There were women in the adjacent compartment. They felt sorry for him and said, 'strike back at them'."

Artur stood his post and held on to the grating so that he wouldn't fall down. He was not allowed to sleep that entire night. His feet swelled from the "bicycle."

The guard detail gave their weapons to the warrant officer at the last station and set about cleaning up their quarters. Artur was assigned to clean the toilet. And they found more reason to harass him. The senior sergeant shouted, "You are taking it easy!" He and his friend grabbed Artur by the arms and again beat him. He barely reached the compartment. As he passed by the warrant officer's compartment his eyes slid over to the weapons safe. The door was slightly open...

One of the soldiers maliciously asked, "You're still here?! Let's get back to cleaning the toilet." They twisted Artur's arms and dragged him into the darkness of the vestibule.

A frightening event took place in the toilet. After hitting Artur several times in the stomach, his tormentors began to feverishly tear his pants off. Artur does not remember how long he was on the metal floor; terrible pain brought him back to consciousness. Someone was holding a burning candle against his body. Someone noted that he was conscious by saying, "Oh, you're regaining your senses? You lie down and rest and in about twenty minutes we will return and repeat it all again."

Artur forced his way through to the warrant officer's compartment. The warrant officer was snoring away. A second later and Artur had pistols in his hands. The warrant officer began to stir and was about to wake up. Artur shot once, again and again... Then on—to where the dregs were! Artur pushed two pistol barrels through the narrow door space and fired again and again. Everything was over in a minute...

Artur's mother received a pretty postcard with pictures on March 8. But this was no holiday greeting. "Mama, Papa! Something unfortunate has happened and it will alter my entire life. But I am not guilty of anything! I am not! The pain and suffering have been building up in me for this entire long six months. The last trip was the final straw. They stripped me, beat me and... I do not remember how I got the weapons and how I fired at them. I am hiding now and I know that they are looking for me. Forgive me for everything. But perhaps we will see one another again. And please, remain calm, it is my fate. Your son Artur"

Yes, Artur saw his mother after this. But he could not say a word to her; only tears came to his eyes. He was not able to withstand the inquest procedures with the many

hours of interrogation, the lines of investigation and the retelling of every detail as to how they had made fun of him. And one day, not long before the Leningrad Military District Tribunal session, during a routine interrogation, Artur stopped objectively absorbing what was going on. The medical diagnosis was reactive psychosis. The preliminary session of the tribunal was still convened, but he was not in the courtroom. His mother sat there. The tribunal gave its decision to the military unit. This ruling included "non-regulatory" relationships and it slightly chided commanders and political workers. The private was sent to a psychiatric hospital until he recovers. The tribunal may convene again later.

Leningrad Military District Military Tribunal Chairman Major General of Legal Services Yu. S. Vyazigin told me, "One has to see the mitigating circumstances in Artur's case, but all the same, he did lift his hand against human lives and he killed the civilian conductor who was not guilty of anything."

Yuriy Semenovich showed me a letter from the parents of those who had been killed. "To the Military Board of the USSR Supreme Court. The serviceman Artur is guilty of the death of our children. This facist murderer has heaped all kinds of dirt on our children to save his own hide. This child who had served a total of eight months in the Army deserves a more severe sentence."

Every parent thinks that his child is the very best. But what if it did turn out that they were involved and did force him. We are not talking about some "evil" yard group or the usual childish "amusement" that is punished by using a father's belt. We are talking about a military subunit in which it has become the norm to degrade human dignity and persecute the weak.

Under interrogation three-time convicted Yevtukhov (the last time was for robbery) told the military procurator investigator, "I was stunned when I saw how guard detail soldiers taunted one another. Relationships are warmer and more amicable even among recidivists and criminals than among these soldiers."

Artur will certainly have a chance to be defended in another manner and he is obliged to make use of this defense. Yes, Artur could and should have acted in another manner. But how? Leningrad District Military Procurator Colonel of Legal Services O. Gavril'yuk answered this for me. "If people insult a recruit, he has the right to appeal to any level of authority. And he can openly and safely report the offense and appeal to the Komsomol organization for assistance."

Appeal to any level of authority? Where? In the special wagon during the trip? Or endure it and wait for the end of the trip and then run to the zampolit [deputy chief for political indoctrination]?

I can foresee one possible reaction. People will say that journalists fish for hot facts and sensations and there are also such cases in our army. I would be glad to agree. But the editor forwards dozens of mournful letters to various military organizations every week. These letters contain the pain, anger and tears of soldiers' mothers. And Artur's story is in no way an attempt to throw a shadow over our army.

We will not argue that positive changes have become a reality in life in the Armed Force. The great assistance that military procurators and the Leningrad District tribunal provided in the preparation of this material is proof of that. Military people understand that today's number one mission is the eradication of Dedovshchina. A lot has been accomplished in that regard. As Political Department Chief for the North-West and Baltic Regional Directorate of Internal Forces Major General V. M. Petrov reported, a methodology for systematically halting non-regulatory relationships has been developed and introduced into the forces. Violations are lessening.

I would like to share Viktor Mikhaylovich's optimism, but... "Dedovshchina" has long been present in military units and today is the military collectives' prime enemy. Replacements enter the army every six months. It is unlikely that every one of these "new" people has to personally experience the "charms" of non-regulatory relationships. But here is a paradox. In a few months yesterday's "salagi" and "shnurka" [not further defined] become "cherpak" [not further defined] and "dedushki" and they "educate" the recruits using the same primitive methods.

How do we change this? Obviously we must first of all understand that "Dedovshchina" is an echo of a stagnant time. Cruelty is not born in the army—it is brought in from civilian life. There are often cases of harassment in the dormitories of secondary professional and technical schools, in discos and in other locations where there are a large number of young people. It is not "calloused old-timers," but rather these sixteen and seventeen year-old adolescents who get involved in abasing the human worth of their own contemporaries. And there is now no one who gets involved with these lads: neither their schools nor their families get involved for, as they say, what can one do with a hooligan!

Artur is now in a psychiatric hospital. His brother Edvard will soon don a military uniform.

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Guards Officer Views Party Conference

Achievements

18000583 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
7 Jul 88 p 1

[Article by Lt Col Sh. Bashenov, Guards, delegate to the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference: "Right Now, Without Delay"]

[Text] The force of inertia. In taking up my pen I felt the urge to begin with enthusiasm, as was previously the

custom. And though, I must say, there was also some of that, I will speak about something else—about the main thing I was thinking about at the party conference. And I was thinking above all about what I in particular could do so that perestroyka in the country, in the armed forces, in my regiment develops and becomes deeper, becomes irreversible, and leads to concrete results? How can I justify the confidence of the people who placed on me this immense responsibility of being a delegate to the conference, which I believe will be a special page forever in the history of our party? And I also thought about my guilt, about the personal part I played in that protracted tranquility that brought the country to stagnation.

The 4 days of the proceedings of the conference passed like a quick wink. But how much they contained, what bold ideas, endowed, it would seem, with conceptions that even yesterday seemed unrealistic, filled the minds and hearts of the party members and all the Soviet people. These days, that great discussion held in the conference, unprecedented in its openness, its devotion to principle, and its honesty, and the decisions adopted at it have made us stronger. I feel this in myself, I saw it in my neighbors when I returned from Moscow to my native region.

Yes, perestroyka has become a part of our life—we all see that. And even now I already feel today the real fruits of the renewal. But at the conference people also spoke with full frankness and honesty about how the changes for the better are taking place too slowly, by no means everywhere, and the revolutionary transformations have not become irreversible. To be sure, it is a reality of life that we still have not managed to overcome the profound causes of the slowdown. It does not take many examples to convince oneself of the rightness of these conclusions. It is enough to mention that the process of renewal has, as a matter of fact, just begun and is taking place in our Army units, that it is not easy to overcome the manifestations of the stagnation, and that also applies to our regiment.

Now all thoughts are about how to implement what was outlined at the conference. The main task which has been set for us, the soldiers of the armed forces, was brought to a focus in the fundamental propositions of the report of M.S. Gorbachev on the priority of qualitative parameters both in the supply of equipment and also in the training and upbringing of the personnel of our armed forces. This spells out the purposes of restructuring in military units, it provides clear and well-adjusted points of reference in the activity of commanding officers, political entities, and party and Komsomol organizations.

How is one to undertake performance of this large and crucial task; what is to be done so as not to repeat the mistakes of the recent past? There have been quite a bit of them, these errors.

I took up my post when the ideas of restructuring were already vigorously making their way in the country's life. It was warmly supported in the Army and in the Navy. The times demanded not only approval of the innovative decisions of the party, but also specific action by everyone.

I honestly admit it: there were sleepless nights and arguments with comrades and long discussions with subordinates. There was all of it. Not everyone was immediately convinced of the idea of the need for restructuring, that we finally had to look honestly at our life and at the results of our work, to get away from half-truths in our evaluations. The first signs of restlessness were that the regimental staff of officers was virtually at odds. Not that everyone did not sit next to one another in assemblies and conferences. Everyone took up his place in the formation shoulder to shoulder. But it was not difficult for the accustomed eye to see that some people, figuratively speaking, were dragging everything out as though they were overloaded, feeling that it was conscientious to work at half-strength. There are quite a few such people in the regiment. But there were also others who confessed a different concept of what was ethical. Some officers had gotten used to the shortcomings in combat training, in the organization of the service, in discipline. It was even thought by some that it was altogether impossible to eradicate them, that they were a kind of "specific feature" of the service. And the atmosphere of security and well-being suited some people.

Meanwhile, the Army was receiving responses that were by no means flattering about the quality of training of specialists in our training regiment. And the strangest thing is that this did not very much disturb those who should have perceived this as bad work on their part.

So that the first thing that had to be done was to shatter the psychology of every officer, warrant officer, and noncommissioned officer. After all, restructuring also signifies a new departure in people's minds and hearts, in their attitudes toward the jobs assigned them, attainment of a thorough understanding by every person of the period that is an acute experience for the country, and his own role and place in solving the problems that have come to a head.

And now, analyzing the state of affairs in the chast from the positions of the requirements of the party conference and its decisions, I have once again become convinced that the reasons for many of the ethical costs should be sought in the offices of the staff headquarters—in the omissions, in the indifference, in the irresponsibility of certain chiefs of services, deputy regimental commanders, and indeed even the commanding officer himself, if we are to be thoroughly frank. The situation demanded constructive changes, not cosmetics. We discussed all this in an expanded meeting of the party committee. The discussion we had at that time was frank and fierce. But the desire to bring about changes in the training of personnel, in strengthening discipline, to overcome manifestations of the stagnation was general, and we were able to quickly understand one another and find a common language.

The party members of the regiment saw one of the tasks of restructuring in a decisive turnabout toward the individual personality—that of the officer, the warrant officer, the noncommissioned officer, and the soldier.

An endeavor was made to stir up creative initiative in people. An attempt was made to establish democratic principles in the life of the regiment by increasing the activity of the party and Komsomol organizations in solving the most important questions and by invigorating public institutions. The need gradually arose to listen to the voice of every member of the collective, to take the individual person's opinion into account. And these are not empty words. The activity of personnel in the regiment increased noticeably—this became a kind of expression of the attitude of the soldiers toward restructuring. Collective opinion is now taken into account in choosing people for positions at the higher level, in evaluating a particular innovation, and in deciding questions related to incentives. The standing certification commission and methods council have begun to enjoy prestige, and the women's council of the chast is having a noticeable influence toward improvement of the level of consumer services and leisure of military personnel, although, of course, there is need for improvement of their work.

And still, if we are to judge by the long list of assignments which the conference presented to us, it has to be admitted that we have only just begun to democratize our Army life. Can we after all speak about democratization, which first of all presupposes respect for human dignity, when there are still officers, though not so very many, including commanding officers and political officials, who still find it natural to engage in bare administration, arrogance, conceit, and rudeness toward subordinates? The uncompromising fight against such manifestations is one of our most important tasks.

In the vocabulary that has been compiled already in the years of restructuring the word "independence" is used frequently. People talk about the need to grant more independence to the farmer, to the cooperative, to the enterprise. And this is right. For my part, I suggest that more independence be given to the regimental commander. Especially in dealing with personnel matters. After all, if it were up to him, surely he would undertake to train young commanders, soldiers who are both drivers and mechanics, soldiers who are both gunners and trackers, and other specialists from people who are not ready to master precisely those military occupations. But today they simply face us with an accomplished fact: here are so many and so many men, teach them. The discussion is quite different when any of our trainees fail to justify the hopes placed on the armed forces.

Or things like this happen. In the regiment there are candidates for promotion who are well-trained and tested in action. Who if not the commander knows best who can be trusted with a company or a battalion, who to appoint chief of an arm or a service? As a rule, a position that becomes vacant is not filled by someone promoted from another chast, someone who may not be worthy in his ability to work and his moral attributes. That is exactly what happened with Lieutenant V. Shorokhov. They sent him to our regiment with the most excellent

MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

recommendations, but it soon became clear that all of the adjectives and references were faked. And this is not an isolated case. So it would seem that the times require the most serious approach to the problem of granting greater independence to the regimental commander.

And there are quite a few other problems which are waiting to be solved. There was also a great deal of severe talk at the conference about the fight against bureaucracy. This is an important task even for us in the military. The manifestations of bureaucracy are diverse. For example, up to now we have not managed to free ourselves of the flow of paper, of the preponderance of instructions and documents, of many other things that hinder our work.

As I analyzed the materials and documents of the party conference I mentally put these questions to myself: Have you been living in such a way and you have done everything so that in both words and deeds you support the course of the party toward renewal, to lead both party members and those who are not members? These are now the most important questions which we must ask ourselves.

In its recent meeting the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee expressed confidence that all party members, every work collective, and all of our country's working people would become actively involved in carrying out the decisions of the conference. Without shilly-shallying, right now, without waiting for any instructions, we party members in the armed forces must also take up this important work. Everyone who is really worthy of that high title is called upon to become a fighter for restructuring. In deeds, not in words. This is the main order issued by the party conference.

07045

National Security in the Nuclear Age
18010259 Moscow KOMMUNIST
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian
No 9, May 88 pp 32-39

[Article by Lt Gen Avn V. Serebryannikov, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor: "National Security in the Nuclear Age"]

[Text] Ensuring national security has always been considered the holy of holies of every state. The armed forces and weapons guarantee its sovereignty. Today, when the armies of the leading countries of the world are equipped with nuclear missiles, unilateral security of a state is unthinkable.

Today the essence of security, the ways and methods of achieving it, and the role of military and nonmilitary means of maintaining it have changed radically. The program of creating a comprehensive system of international security, put forward by the Soviet Union, is

receiving increasingly broader support and recognition in the world arena. The struggle to implement it is already yielding the first reassuring results.

The comprehensive system of international security, the fundamentals of which were developed by the 27th CPSU Congress, assumes the establishment of relations between countries and peoples which ensure the protection of mankind as a whole and each state individually against nuclear catastrophe and disasters of a military, economic, ecological and humanitarian nature. Its main feature is the concern for protecting the world and every nation against world nuclear and conventional war, and also against local wars, armed conflicts and military terrorism.

Unfortunately, historical experience in this area is limited. Security under conditions of antagonistic socio-economic formations, if we can talk about it in general as it applies to the past, was temporary, limited and unstable, as evidenced by the endless wars and conflicts.

The victory of the Great October Revolution became a turning point in the approach to the problem of security. From the moment of its emergence, the Soviet state declared war to be the greatest crime facing mankind and called for all countries to build relations on the principles of peaceful coexistence and to begin to reduce and eliminate weapons, that is, to destroy the material basis of wars and conflicts. Only the hatred and savage malice of the international bourgeoisie toward the victorious socialist revolution and the attempts by world imperialist reaction to smother it by force of arms compelled the first state of workers and peasants in history to create a strong defense and a powerful regular army. It is only the fault of imperialism that military means of defense also became for socialism the main means of ensuring its security. Without them it was impossible to repel the two major invasions of international forces of imperialism and foil their numerous aggressive actions against the Soviet Union. Encircled by capitalist states for a long time, the USSR was forced to rely on military force to defend socialism and safeguard its security. Objective circumstances dictated this. The Soviet Union's persistent struggle for collective security in the face of the aggressive preparations of Hitler's Germany in the 1930's was not supported by the ruling circles of England and France. In 1939 they refused to conclude a military alliance of collective security with the USSR which could have become an effective obstacle in the path of fascist aggression and prevented World War II.

After it ended, a unique opportunity to build a world without wars appeared. A mechanism of international cooperation—the United Nations—was created for this purpose. But world imperialism, led by the United States, ruined this historic opportunity, having put nuclear weapons at the service of its expansionist goals. The imperialist circles of the United States and other NATO member states, opposing in every possible way a ban on nuclear weapons and, what is more, having

unleashed a feverish arms race, embarked on the path of atomic blackmail, sharply exacerbated the confrontation with socialism and stepped up interference in the internal affairs of many countries of the world.

The threat of a world nuclear conflagration poses problems of international security in a completely different way. The task of ensuring external security has gone beyond the exclusive competence of an individual state (or bloc) and can only be achieved within the framework of world society. Security has become indivisible—it is either for all, or for none. For example, there cannot be security for the USSR without security for the USA, or security for the Warsaw Pact countries without security for the NATO countries. It is possible only as universal security.

Security today can only be equal. Less security for one opposing side is disadvantageous for the other side, for it destabilizes the strategic situation and intensifies suspicion and fear. Attempts by one side to raise the level of its own security at the expense or to the detriment of the other or attempts to achieve unilateral superiority provoke corresponding retaliatory actions. This inevitably leads to an increase in the level of military confrontation and lessens both overall security and the security of each state individually.

"The nature of today's weapons," it was emphasized at the 27th CPSU Congress, "leaves no hope for any state to protect itself solely by military-technical means, say, by developing a defense—even the most powerful one. Ensuring security increasingly appears as a political task that can be accomplished only by political means."

New political thinking, dialogue, relations of mutually beneficial cooperation, and an international political and legal, moral and psychological, and organizational mechanism for peaceful coexistence of states are the nonmilitary means which can be used to restructure the entire system of international relations. By relying on them, states are in a position to accomplish an historical task: to change the world from a nuclear to a nuclear-free world; from one fraught with a new war to a secure one; from one torn to pieces by violence, wars, and conflicts to a nonviolent one. Universal and class interests of the working people merge together in accomplishing this task.

The transition from a world in which security would be ensured primarily by military means to a world in which the decisive role would actually shift to nonmilitary (political) means is neither a smooth one-act nor a contradictory process, but a persistent, tenacious and rather lengthy struggle in stages. The transformation of nonmilitary (political) means into universal means of ensuring security is an objective requirement for preserving and prolonging the life of the human race.

The dialectics of this transformation, depending on specific conditions, include a different combination of military and nonmilitary means of ensuring security: 1) a decisive role of military means, with nonmilitary means

having secondary importance; 2) relatively equal importance of both; 3) actual predominance of nonmilitary means (creation of an effective political mechanism for blocking war and military conflicts), with military means fulfilling a secondary role; 4) the transformation of peaceful coexistence into the only form of relations between states with different structures and the disappearance of military confrontation and the danger of war.

Political means (nonmilitary) are intended not only to halt the arms race, this irrational race of mankind toward the precipice, but also to eliminate local wars and conflicts. It is through political measures that the USSR is striving to break this chain decisively, having proposed a specific plan for ending the regional military conflict in Afghanistan. The statement by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev on 8 February 1988 on Afghanistan became a new, important Soviet initiative. It specified dates and conditions acceptable to all for withdrawal of the limited contingent of Soviet forces from this country. A meeting between General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev and Mr. Najibullah, president of the Republic of Afghanistan and general secretary of the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan took place in Tashkent on 7 April. The leaders of the two countries announced that the Soviet Union and the Republic of Afghanistan would act in accordance with this statement. The signing of an agreement on Afghanistan in Geneva and the implementation of a policy toward national reconciliation will promote the strengthening of peace and security not only in Asia but throughout the entire planet and will stimulate the process of ending other regional conflicts which could be stopped completely in several years.

In advancing a far-reaching program for freeing mankind from the danger of nuclear catastrophe, wars and military conflicts and for establishing a strong peace, the CPSU and other fraternal parties scientifically substantiate real ways and methods of implementing it. An in-depth analysis of complex questions is given in the documents of the Leninist party: Is it possible to block the most dangerous manifestations of the aggressive nature of imperialism? Is a transition of the ruling circles of the West to new political thinking possible? Are there guarantees that they will sincerely support a restructuring of international relations and participate in creating a comprehensive system of international security?

Imperialism has changed substantially in its almost 9 decades of history. It differs in many ways from what it was in the early and even middle of the 20th century. It has proved to be more stable and adaptable to new conditions than it was 50 and even 20 or 30 years ago. At that time it was believed that by the beginning of the 21st century imperialism as a social system would be shattered by revolutionary storms. Now it is obvious that it will enter the next century. Does this allow us to speak about the possibility of creating a security system based on political means?

Up to the mid-1950's, it was asserted that wars would disappear only with the disappearance of capitalism. In the 1950's and 1960's, communists scientifically substantiated that peace could be "imposed" on capitalism and a new world war prevented. This conclusion was first made at the 20th CPSU Congress. It was substantiated that even with capitalism preserved as a social system it was possible to exclude war from the life of society. In the 1980's, theoretical thought went further: Conclusions were reached that it was possible to build a secure, nonnuclear, unarmed and nonviolent world in conditions with capitalism still existing as a social system. The Leninist concept of peaceful coexistence was creatively developed and new political thinking was formulated as a precondition to the establishment of a reliable system of international security. The 27th CPSU Congress and documents associated with the 70th anniversary of the Great October Revolution made a particularly large contribution to this.

The confidence that peace can be imposed on imperialism and that it can be compelled to renounce militarism and wars is based on strong arguments. First of all, the laws of an integral world can limit the area influenced by the narrow class interests of monopolistic capital, block the most dangerous manifestations of the predatory nature of imperialism, and force it to accept the most important principles of the new political thinking. Secondly, the ever-increasing pressure of the potential of peace is able to change significantly the policy of imperialist reaction and curb its aggressive military aspirations. Thirdly, the achieved military-strategic parity between the socialist world and the capitalist world has nullified the possibility of Western militaristic circles achieving any political goals by means of war against a new social system. Fourthly, the instinct for self-preservation also urges the imperialist bourgeoisie toward restraint in world policy. It will not be able to survive without giving the other an opportunity to live.

A major, truly historical event which confirmed the reality of our peace-oriented plans was the signing of the agreement between the USSR and USA on the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles in Washington in early December 1987. The CPSU Central Committee Politburo noted at its session on 17 December that the INF Treaty is historical, since it states for the first time a decision actually to destroy two classes of nuclear weapons of the USSR and the USA. This is the first real step toward arms reduction. The primary role here belongs to the persistent, steady, and constructive peace-oriented policy of the Soviet Union and the entire socialist community. Elements of realistically thinking politicians of a number of capitalist countries also played their role. At a meeting in Washington, the parties agreed to complete by late spring or early summer 1988 work on an agreement on a 50-percent reduction of strategic offensive nuclear weapons of the USSR and the USA. The world public considers the implementation of such measures as a serious prerequisite for a significant increase in the level of international security.

When speaking about these positive changes in the political thinking of leading figures of the West, one must not lose sight of the obvious fact that militaristic circles in the United States and NATO and the bosses of the military-industrial complex of the leading imperialist powers are stubbornly hindering the normalization of relations between states with different social systems, the policy of detente and the ending of the arms race. They have not renounced aggressive plans with respect to the USSR and the entire socialist community. They continue their gross interference in the internal affairs of other states, wage undeclared wars against freedom-loving peoples, and are stepping up their efforts to realize their plans to achieve military superiority. The reactionary circles of the West are obsessed with the wild idea that peace can be built further only on the ruins of socialism.

Thus, the militaristic forces of imperialist states continue to be captive to old illusions. The thinking and actions of many Western politicians with respect to the problems of security are still dominated by the approach formed over centuries. The USA and NATO operate on the concept of ensuring their "absolute security" at the expense of the "absolute danger" of all other countries, primarily the USSR, counting on achieving a decisive military superiority and possessing a new "superweapon."

The ruling circles of imperialist states are trying to convince their people that their security supposedly depend entirely upon military means, above all, nuclear weapons, and upon creation of the notorious SDI and a dominating position in space.

Once the first growth appeared on the field of disarmament—the Soviet-American INF agreement—NATO "hawks" unleashed a feverish campaign to prevent the development of this process, to take immediate steps to "compensate" for the missiles eliminated, to move new nuclear forces closer to and into Europe, to modernize the remaining weapon systems, to accelerate work on SDI, and so forth. "Reactionary, rabidly anti-Soviet forces are consolidating," Comrade M.S. Gorbachev noted at the February 1988 CPSU Central Committee Plenum. "All kinds of 'analysts' and Kremlinologists are making frightening recommendations to the governments, are cluttering up the minds of the public, and intimidating with 'catastrophic' consequences for the West if the process of disarmament continues."

It is perfectly obvious that as long as imperialist politicians think in obsolete categories, as long as there is no effective mechanism for governing military-political processes in the world, as long as the danger of war remains and social revanchism remains the pivot of strategy of the militaristic programs of Western ruling circles, military means retain the most important role for us in holding back the aggressor. However, use of them by socialist countries is subordinated to the policy of struggling for peace, preventing war and strengthening nonmilitary (political) means in establishing universal security.

The truly historical importance of the established military-strategic balance between the USSR and USA, between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, for the fate of all mankind is also perfectly obvious. Preserving and maintaining this balance is an extremely serious factor for ensuring peace and international security. Nonmilitary means cannot be effective in today's situation without this factor, for imperialism has become accustomed to and still follows the old misanthropic logic of ignoring the weak. This creates tremendous difficulties in implementing a program for establishing a universal system of international security. It requires reliable protections of socialism and a high level of vigilance and combat readiness of the USSR Armed Forces and the fraternal armies of the Warsaw Pact countries.

Our military cadres must thoroughly understand the dialects of these interrelated processes for the correct resolution of the complex problems of protecting socialism in the nuclear-space age under conditions of the consistent struggle of the USSR and other socialist countries to restructure international relations and establish new approaches to ensuring security. Life forces us to rethink the customary ideas of war, policy in the area of defense, military doctrines, organizational development and training of the armed forces, and so forth.

The profound change in the goals, forms, and methods of activities of socialist states in the area of defense, taking into account nuclear realities, is that these activities are directed primarily toward realization of an entire complex of military problems in the process of creating a universal system of international security. Two groups of goals and tasks are clearly identified in the document "Military Doctrine of Warsaw Pact Member-States," adopted at the Berlin meeting of the Political Consultative Committee in May 1987. This document reflects the basic policy provisions in the area of defense and military organizational development of the USSR and allied socialist countries. The first group includes long-range, far-reaching, revolutionary measures which transform military affairs so that it is brought to the smallest scale possible and can serve only defense. It is envisaged that this transformation will be implemented on a mutual basis simultaneously and synchronously with the Western states. The second group of goals and tasks is directed toward ensuring protection of socialism under actually existing conditions, when the military might of our state continues to play a decisive role in restraining the aggressor and when, as V.I. Lenin taught, it is necessary to possess all the means, forms and methods of combat that a potential enemy may possess.

The following are defined as fundamental goals in the doctrine: arms reduction and the elimination of weapons of mass destruction; restructuring of armed forces in Europe so they can only provide a defense and are unable to initiate offensive operations or execute a surprise attack; mutual renunciation by Warsaw Pact and NATO member-states of the threat or use of force; simultaneous dissolution of the blocs, with the elimination of their military

organizations as a first step; implementation of confidence-building measures, and so forth.

The promulgated military doctrine of the USSR is genuinely innovative, as are the doctrines of the other Warsaw Pact states. Whereas before, Soviet military doctrine, which originated unchanged from the peace-oriented policy of the socialist state, concentrated its primary attention on preparation for and conduct of retaliatory wars in defense of socialism, now it includes a broader content. It reflects our realistic views on the basic questions of war and peace, and the major emphasis is placed on preventing war and strengthening the foundations of universal security and peace. For the first time in history military doctrine does not represent a code of basic rules for preparing for and conducting wars, but a political-theoretical foundation for preventing them. The Soviet Union has promulgated not simply a defensive doctrine but a doctrine directed against war. It fully conforms to the new political thinking developed by the 27th CPSU Congress. For the first time in history the primary mission of the armed forces is to prevent war, both nuclear and conventional.

The defensive nature of Soviet military doctrine, like the Warsaw Pact military doctrine, is that it originates from the commitment not to use nuclear weapons first. There is no place in it for concepts inherent to U.S. and NATO military doctrine such as "first strike," "preemptive strike," "preventive strike," and so forth.

The USSR and the fraternal socialist countries have stated firmly and clearly before the entire world that they will never under any circumstances initiate military actions first against any state or alliance of states whatsoever if they themselves are not the object of armed attack. It has been said with all certainty that we have no territorial claims against anyone, do not consider any state or people to be our enemy, and are prepared to build relations with all on a peace-oriented basis.

The new doctrine has been creatively developed; views on fundamental questions of military organizational development and preparation of the country and the armed forces to repel aggression have been rethought and changed. The principle of reasonable sufficiency must be the basis for solving problems of the reliable protection of socialism. However, it is clear that the level of this sufficiency is limited by the position and actions of the opposing side—the USA and its military bloc partners.

Maintaining the defense potential of the country and the combat might of the armed forces within the limits of reasonable sufficiency has a fully concrete expression. The essence of sufficiency for the Soviet Union's strategic nuclear forces is determined by the need not to permit a nuclear strike with impunity in any situation, even the most unfavorable. Sufficiency for conventional forces means that quantity and quality of armed forces and arms which is capable of ensuring the reliable

defense of our country and its socialist allies. The Soviet Union does not seek greater security than the USA and NATO, but will not accept less.

We have no intention of competing with the West in creating specific types of weapons; we choose those measures which ensure the security of the Soviet state and its allies. Proceeding from the principle of sufficiency, the USSR is making efforts to lower decisively the level of confrontation and reduce military potentials so the West and the East have only the forces and resources necessary for defense. But this must apply to everyone. The socialist states proceed from the fact that lowering the level of strategic balance and mutually reducing offensive capabilities guarantee greater security.

The military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact states is aimed at preserving the military balance between socialism and imperialism at that level which has been established at a specific moment.

Our cadres must realize that significant changes have taken place not only in the political but also the military-technical side of the military doctrine, which determines the methods of preparing for and conducting an armed struggle in defense of socialism and the directions of organizational development and training of the armed forces. The directive not to use nuclear weapons first and not to initiate military actions first is realized in the training of staffs and troops at the strategic and tactical levels and in increasing the vigilance and combat readiness of the troops to repel aggression under the most unfavorable conditions. The doctrine is aimed at the creative development of military science and military art and at comprehensive improvement of the armed forces within the limits of reasonable sufficiency.

The views toward the basic methods of actions by the Soviet Armed Forces in repelling aggression are also changing substantially. The need to prevent war and reliably protect socialism under today's conditions imperatively demands a consistent defensive approach in determining the method of repelling aggression. What is new is that defensive operations and combat actions will be the main method of actions by the Soviet Armed Forces in the event we are attacked by an aggressor. Of course, this orientation in training the Army and Navy puts them in a more difficult position in the event of aggression, but the interests of preventing war and establishing trust in the military area dictate this as the only reasonable approach which will work for a peaceful future. The new approach in repelling possible aggression assumes a significant increase in vigilance, stronger moral-political and psychological training of personnel,

and the ability to conduct successful combat operations in the most complex conditions. In this connection, the emphasis in military art, military planning, combat training, and troop control is changing.

Emphasis on defensive actions does not at all mean that our military doctrine is losing the spirit of activeness and decisiveness or that it is oriented on passiveness. It would be an intolerable mistake to comprehend the defensive nature of the doctrine in this manner. On the contrary, all its content is aimed at the highest activeness, decisiveness, initiative and creativity in carrying out combat missions, and heroic and unselfish fulfillment of military duty.

It is clear that it is impossible to defeat an aggressor by defense. Therefore, our troops and naval forces must be capable of conducting a decisive offensive after repelling an enemy attack; it will take the form of a counteroffensive.

The USSR Armed Forces are developing in accordance with the new military doctrine. Combat and political training and the entire life and activities of the troops are being restructured based on its provisions and guidelines.

Fundamentally important is the program provision that the CPSU also considers it necessary in the future to intensify its organizing and guiding influence on the life and activities of the armed forces, strengthen one-man command on a party basis, increase the role and influence of political bodies and party organizations of the Soviet Army and Navy, and see to it that principles of democratism are implemented more persistently and that the vital bond between the Army and the people becomes stronger.

In connection with the prospects of creating a comprehensive system of international security, the party is examining not only ways to achieve this goal but also specific tasks of reliably ensuring the country's defensive capability. It proceeds from the fact that we will go through a number of stages related to lowering the level of military confrontation and that a mutual reduction of armed forces by states cannot diminish the role of high vigilance and combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces. Equipped with everything necessary and improved types of weapons and equipment, they are reliably safeguarding the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and the achievements of socialism.

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Military Aspect of Common European Home
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[Article by Sergey Aleksandrovich Karaganov, candidate of historical Sciences, department chief in the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Europe: "The Military Aspect of the 'Common European Home'"]

[Text] The debate on the future of Europe is unfolding in all the countries of the continent and across the ocean. It is becoming increasingly obvious that real prerequisites are being created for moving forward to the building in Europe of a new security system that is more humane and more oriented on humankind and that overcomes the military division and is based on cooperation and good-neighborliness among all European states. It is precisely this kind of security system that lies behind the popularity that is being rapidly gained by the concept of the "common European home."

The prerequisites in the military-political field are obvious, but they have still not been the subject of extensive discussion on our country. They are considered in this article.

The late sixties and first half of the seventies were evidently the last period in the development of military-strategic relations between the United States and its allies—a period that was relatively favorable even with all the crisis phenomena. The crisis in NATO originating in the sixties and resulting from recognition of the consequences stemming from the strategic vulnerability of the United States and the advancement of the concept of "flexible response" in its initial American version, had by that time been partially overcome. The NATO version of the concept of "flexible response" was a compromise designed to paper over the existing disagreements.

From the latter half of the sixties and the beginning of the following decade the increase in the quantitative makeup and the greater combat capability of the U.S. nuclear potential in Europe, and the rapid buildup of U.S. strategic forces through deployment of multiple reentry vehicles to some extent halted the the declining trust of U.S. allies in the reliability of the U.S. "nuclear guarantees." The development of detente processes in Europe calmed the fears of the West Europeans and made their remaining doubts about the reliability of those "guarantees" less significant, and in general reduced the significance of the military sphere in East-West relations.

The recognition by many American leaders and military strategists in the late sixties that the Warsaw Pact did not possess any kind of substantial advantages in terms of the combat potential of its general purpose armed forces somewhat alleviated the concern that had traditionally existed in West Europe.

This lessening of concern was also helped by the serious complication of Sino-Soviet relations in the sixties and seventies. Most West European leaders thought that this was diverting USSR forces and reducing the possibility of "pressure" on West Europe. In the eyes of many West Europeans the balance of military power had shifted in favor of the West. One of the first to express this thought was Ch. de Gaulle.¹ Thus, West Europe moved on to detente under conditions of a balance of military power that had shifted strategically but apparently also favored the West tactically. Detente processes were not so unambiguously linked to the change in this relationship in favor of socialism, as was widely asserted in those years.

From the mid-Seventies the military-strategic situation started to change. Eliminating the U.S. advantages, the Soviet Union responded by initiating the deployment of MRV's on its own ICBM's and then on its submarine-launched ballistic missiles. As a result, what occurred was, to use the formulation of the eminent Soviet expert on military strategy G.A. Trofimenko, "a real situation of Soviet-U.S. parity: not simply the numerical equality of the sides' strategic launchers but equality in terms of the real combat capabilities of their strategic forces."² This situation took shape at the turn of the Seventies and Eighties but military strategists had understood beforehand that it was inevitable.

From the standpoint of West European experts and the politicians whom they served, it turned out that the USSR had acquired both flexibility and counterforce potential in its strategic forces, that is, as far as the U.S. leadership was concerned, the ability to "respond at the same level" against military targets on American territory. This meant that Washington's readiness to deliver a first, "limited" nuclear strike against targets on Soviet territory was undermined, and this implicated the concept of the U.S. "nuclear guarantees" in the event that NATO should be losing a war in Europe.

As is known, the Soviet Union rejects the concept of "limited nuclear war." But, following American experts, West European strategists do not believe the Soviet statements and ascribe to the USSR plans and intentions similar to their own. And in so doing they fall into the trap of their own logic.

These misgivings were openly expressed by one of West Germany's most influential strategists, U. Nerlich: "Without the invulnerability of U.S. ICBM's, expanded containment is no longer a realistic goal. [...] ...the possibility that [the Soviet Union] will strike U.S. ICBM's in response to a limited strategic attack within the framework of a European conflict would serve rather to place limits on flexibility right from the very start"³ (that is, there can no longer be any kind of "limited" strike).

In the opinion of the West the USSR has "severed" the last, and for the West European capitals, the most valuable step on the "staircase of escalation," that the

United States had until recently been strengthening through the buildup of its own forces and the "Schlesinger doctrine." This change in the situation will evidently be irreversible into the foreseeable future. No buildup by the United States of its counterforce advantages, flexibility or survivability can—in the eyes of Washington and the West European capitals—deprive the USSR of a theoretical capability for a "limited" retaliatory strike against targets in the United States, neutralizing the threat of a U.S. "limited" first strike against Soviet territory.

The concern of military-political circles in the West European NATO countries was deepened even more seriously by the change in the military balance. Before the latter half of the Seventies, in NATO they proceeded from the premise of that bloc's possession of superiority in nuclear forces in the "European theater of military operations." As was noted in a report of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, during the early stages of the SALT-II negotiations (in the mid-seventies) it was considered that "the United States possesses major advantages in the strategic field, while NATO possesses advantages in the field of theater nuclear forces."⁴ In an official report of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—the highest military organ in the United States—presented to the Congress in 1978 it was asserted that "overall the United States has retained its superiority in theater nuclear forces but should continue to develop and deploy new systems so as to respond to the challenge of Soviet modernization efforts."⁵

This superiority was counted by proceeding both from the larger number of nuclear weapons at NATO's disposal and attached to it, and from the qualitative and quantitative advantages in terms of delivery vehicles. It was thought that Soviet nuclear forces earmarked for a retaliatory strike in Europe were largely vulnerable. The following is a typical example of these kinds of calculations. "Even in the mid-Seventies the nuclear balance in Europe was in NATO's favor," Pentagon and U.S. Congress consultant J. Record wrote. "The alliance possessed a 2:1 superiority in the number of weapons that they could deliver, and major qualitative advantages in terms of delivery vehicles, especially aircraft. The Warsaw Pact had virtually no artillery capable of shooting down nuclear weapons or the aircraft carrying nuclear weapons, such as the F-111 and the F-4. Both at the level of battlefield weapons and the level of nuclear weapons the Warsaw Pact relied on the relatively inaccurate ballistic missiles and high-yield weapons; which virtually denied them selective, flexibly controlled use. Soviet long-range systems consisted of obsolescent and in many cases obsolete missiles and aircraft."⁶

In the opinion of American strategists, from the mid-seventies the situation was rapidly transformed. According to Western figures, the USSR started to deploy a new generation of tactical and operational-tactical missiles and short-range and medium-range missiles that were more accurate, survivable and mobile. The number of

artillery tubes available to the troops and capable of firing nuclear weapons grew rapidly. Deployment of a new generation of aircraft was initiated, capable, so it was considered in the West, of carrying nuclear weapons, including the Backfire (in the Western terminology) medium bomber. Modernization of the air defense system made penetration by NATO bombers and fighter-bombers to their targets more difficult.⁷ As a result by 1979-1980, according to official assessments by the U.S. Department of Defense, the Warsaw Pact had achieved parity with NATO in terms of nuclear forces in Europe.⁸

The SS-20 (RSD-10) missiles were not the only reason for all these shifts, but it was they that mainly become a symbol of them; which explains in part why they (and, it must be admitted, not without success) were nominated as the pretext to justify the deployment of U.S. intermediate-range missiles. As the well-known English expert H. Strachen wrote, "the SS-20 means that NATO no longer possesses the capability of escalation dominance at the level of battlefield nuclear weapons." In the words of the Carter Administration's Secretary of State C. Vance, in the late Seventies Washington was concerned that "deployment of the SS-20 missile might lead to an erosion of the advantages in nuclear forces in the European theater on which NATO has been pinning its hopes since the fifties."⁹

The impression was created that the fact that before the late Seventies (at least as they saw it in the West) the USSR had been lagging seriously in terms of nuclear forces in Europe had passed unnoticed by our science and practical policy.

It is difficult to explain in any other way why when we caught up we announced that parity existed (although this kind of adjusted parity obviously was not a separate category of the nuclear arsenal in Europe, namely intermediate-range forces, needed arbitrarily for negotiation. For, as was also pointed out in the Soviet statements, NATO had a one-and-half-times advantage in the number of weapons that could be delivered by Western intermediate forces in a single launch or sortie).

It is thought that if our position at the negotiations had proceeded from the actual state of affairs, that is, from the fact that the USSR had been catching up, it would have been much more convincing for the public in the West. But the NATO propagandists were robbed of the opportunity to undermine trust in us when they pointed out that in the opinion of the USSR parity in intermediate forces had existed both in 1979 and in 1982, despite the buildup of the total number of intermediate-range weapons.

The Soviet Union did not achieve the nuclear "superiority" of which it was accused as the result of the measures proposed to modernize the nuclear potential in Europe. But in the eyes of an overwhelming majority of experts and politicians in the West what undoubtedly

had happened was that the USSR had altered the nuclear balance, and at the turn of the seventies and eighties had eliminated NATO's superiority at the level of the nuclear balance in Europe.

In NATO they saw that in addition to the formation of strategic parity de facto that bloc had lost is capability for "escalation dominance" at the lower levels of nuclear conflict that they thought they possessed previously. According to U.S. views, this capability means denying the enemy a rational opportunity to escalate an armed conflict since each new level would mean that he was in an even more unfavorable position than before. "Escalation dominance" was the theoretical foundation of the concept of "nuclear first strike in Europe," and of hopes of "limited" nuclear war and "victory" in it. All these ideas were designed to confirm the reliability of the "nuclear guarantees."

Hopes of realizing these concepts were dashed—the "guarantees" had lost their plausibility. The entire theoretical underpinning of NATO strategy had been torn down.

The fact that the steps taken by the USSR were defensive in nature led precisely to the augmentation of strategic parity by nuclear balance at the European level, and not to "superiority," as the NATO propagandists later began to assert; and in materials not intended for general consumption many U.S. and West European experts in the main acknowledged this to be true. In particular, a leading analyst at the Rand Corporation, B. Lambeth, wrote that as a result of the change in the nuclear balance both at the central and European levels, "the United States has effectively lost the capability of escalation dominance over the USSR thanks to the fact that Moscow has achieved strategic parity and parity at the theater level."¹⁰

This very same conclusion was later confirmed by a very authoritative Rand report dealing with work on a program for the development of NATO: "Changes in the armed forces of the USSR have undermined the capability for escalation dominance that NATO previously possessed, and have enabled the USSR to worry less than previously about the threat of escalation in a conflict."¹¹

J. Record formulated extremely precisely the meaning of the changes that had taken place. He pointed out that it amounted to "a further undermining of the plausibility of the strategy of flexible response proclaimed by NATO. As it is, the viability of flexible response, now seriously weakened by the loss of superiority in the field of strategic forces and the continuing lagging in conventional forces, has been basically emasculated... Even NATO's loss of strategic superiority could have been tolerated if the alliance had maintained major advantages in nuclear forces in Europe. Superior nuclear forces in the TVD's would have continued to serve as plausible insurance in the event that non-nuclear defense would be

overwhelmed, and would have offered significant opportunities for escalation dominance, at least at the lower and middle levels... Unfortunately, all parts of the NATO triad (strategic forces, theater nuclear forces, conventional forces—author) have been undermined. For at least a decade use of NATO nuclear weapons in Europe will for sure be unable to alter the course and result of any conflict but only increase the numbers of casualties among the military and civilian population on both sides."¹²

In the perception of most experts and politicians in the West, these shifts led to qualitative change in the military-political situation in Europe. Obviously this assessment corresponds in general with the actual state of affairs.

Through its measures of a defensive nature the Soviet Union had virtually neutralized the threat of deliberate U.S. and NATO use of nuclear weapons at any level, and emasculated the "nuclear first-strike" concept. Now, in the eyes of Western strategists such a strike at any level would threaten not only escalation to all-out nuclear war but does not even hold out the promise of any kind of nuclear advantages. The idea that the Soviet Union has acquired the capability "of responding at the same level" made first strike essentially unthinkable even from the theoretical standpoint. The structures with which Western strategists tried to substantiate the reliability of the "guarantees," the concept of "expanded containment" and so forth have been destroyed.

In our opinion this meant the following. The efforts by the Soviet people to strengthen the defense capabilities of the USSR led to a major reduction in the threat of attack against the Soviet Union and to a strengthening of the security of our country and its allies. For, as is known, in the eyes of U.S. strategists, the concept of first strike was designed not only to be the basis of the "nuclear guarantees" but also a threat to unleash nuclear war against the USSR and a tool to exert pressure on the socialist countries. Not only the threat of nuclear aggression has been reduced, but also the threat of attack using only conventional weapons. By to some extent "decoupling" nuclear weapons, the USSR has seriously weakened NATO's potential offensive capabilities.

And not only because NATO's sharply reduced capability to use nuclear weapons obviously means also a qualitative weakening of that bloc's offensive potential, of which a key part is nuclear weapons. The undermining of the plausibility of the threat of using them also reduces the potential effectiveness of using conventional forces within the framework of the "NATO integrated strategy." This strategy assumes that the threat to use nuclear weapons strengthens the potential of conventional forces (by forcing the other side to arrange its defensive procedures giving consideration to the possibility of a nuclear strike). Contrariwise, the threat of a non-nuclear offensive is designed to enhance the effectiveness of the use of nuclear weapons.

The fact that NATO is deprived of a plausible first-strike threat has one other serious consequence. Theoretically, for the Soviet Union there is now no need to compensate for NATO's nuclear superiority through the quantitative and qualitative composition of conventional weapons and armed forces. Obviously the kind of opportunities have appeared for reducing those forces that our country has not had during the entire postwar period. Thus, there is not only an obvious need but also favorable prerequisites that henceforth effective Soviet defense development can be insured, as was noted in the CPSU Central Committee to the 19th All-Union Party Conference, "preferentially through qualitative parameters with regard both to equipment and to personnel."¹³

The phenomena described are superimposed on many political factors: there are no contradictions in Europe for whose resolution the West could risk unleashing war; the improved aspect and enhanced prestige of the USSR are strengthening the positions of peace-loving forces and making it difficult for the militarists to agitate and mobilize the masses on an anti-Soviet platform, even less support military aggression. There are no fascist regimes in the developed capitalist countries. And, as history teaches, an imperialist state functioning in the form of a fascist dictatorship and an imperialist state functioning in the form of a bourgeois democracy are qualitatively different concepts. All this taken together signifies a major reduction in the threat of aggression in Europe and in imperialism's ability to exert military-political pressure on socialism.

But we are still far from the total elimination of the threat of war in Europe. The danger exists of accidental, uncontrollable escalation of some crisis under conditions of the enormous saturation of the armed forces of both sides with nuclear weapons and offensive arms; and that, as previously, NATO will cling to the concept of first-use of nuclear weapons and have appropriate operational plans. Moreover, the threat of war can grow in the event of prolonged destabilization of the arms race for the latest weapons of a clearly offensive nature, for which the Pentagon is calling.

Together with the political processes taking place in Europe and the reluctance of the allies to pay for the implementation of U.S. military plans, the changes in the military balance that we have been discussing are noticeably reducing the opportunities for the United States to use NATO and its allies in the alliance as a tool to exert military-political pressure on the socialist world. Thanks to this, since the late seventies the trend toward a lesser role for NATO and West Europe in U.S. global strategy has been strengthened.

The value of the Atlantic alliance and its allies as tools in the strategy of "containing communism" has declined. There has been a corresponding decline in Washington's readiness to make concessions to its allies, and the trend toward "going it alone" in decisionmaking, "withdrawing" from Europe and "writing off" the European

theater because it holds out no promise on the plane of exerting pressure on socialism has increased, in both policy and military strategy.

The consequences of these changes have been particularly serious for the United States' West European allies.

From the standpoint of most leading circles in the West European countries, the balance of forces in Europe has shifted in favor of the Soviet Union. We are being judged "for what we are," or rather, from what the United States is, which often makes quite high-handed use of its favorable balance of forces in particular regions to exert pressure, and even for aggression (examples for the eighties include Lebanon, Libya, Nicaragua and Grenada). Hence the conclusion that in order to prevent the USSR from behaving in similar fashion it is essential to balance the shift of power in its direction.

The importance of the imbalances in conventional arms has risen sharply, and there is additional impetus for the traditional fear of "impending" Soviet might. In general, the political importance of the sphere of conventional arms and armed forces has grown.

In the opinion of most Western politicians and experts the situation has been complicated still further by the fact, as NATO propagandists assert, that in recent years the USSR has allegedly been building up the quantitative advantages that it possesses in conventional forces and at the same time, by improving the qualitative characteristics of new conventional systems has closed the quality gap that existed in the fifties and sixties.

The practical lack of authoritative data to counteract this kind of propaganda campaign has led to a situation in which most politicians and a significant proportion of the public in the West have believed the thesis on "the relative strength" of Warsaw Pact positions in the conventional field. But the main thing is that the process that started in the fifties, when the United States was deprived of its strategic invulnerability, is now complete. Since the end of the last decade a situation has taken shape in which West European politicians who still think rationally have been unable seriously to count on the United States using nuclear weapons for their "defense." NATO's military conceptual foundation has been emasculated. For eight or nine years now only the "shell" of the old system of nuclear pledges has existed within the NATO framework. The bloc has entered a period of profound structural crisis.

Leading circles in the West European countries sense that they are in a situation in which the foundations of the old security system have been undermined. It is becoming increasingly unreliable for them but they see no solution and no new system has been suggested. The capitals of West Europe now find themselves in the midst of a process of almost feverish search for ways to repair or replace the old security system.

Washington and the forces in the allied NATO countries like it are trying to fill the vacuum that has been formed in West Europe's security system because of the undermining of the plausibility of the American "nuclear guarantees." A buildup of NATO's non-nuclear might is being proposed, defining the bloc's "conventionalization" through the development and deployment of a new generation of conventional weapons and thanks to this, less dependence on nuclear weapons. One variant that is popular in the Pentagon and on the West European right envisages the simultaneous deployment of the latest conventional weapons and a new generation of nuclear weapons. The West European capitals are trying to fill this vacuum by activating a process of military integration. Right before their eyes Washington is altering its initial attitude to them to support this trend.

The "Atlantists" see the main problem in preventing West Europe from solving the NATO crisis by reducing arms and through political detente, and in maintaining the division of Europe into military blocs. Rejection of the variant that reduces conventional forces and equalizes and stabilizes the military balance is also typical of the Washington proponents of the strategy of exhausting the Soviet Union militarily and economically. For, according to Western figures, a large part of the economic burden to maintain the military balance in Europe is being carried by the USSR and the U.S. allies. This means that they rather than the United States are also more likely to gain from a reduction in the military confrontation in Europe.

Obvious attempts can also be seen to repeat the scenarios of 1979-1983: provoke political crisis, increase tension, halt the USSR's peace offensive, and gain time for conventional and nuclear re-arming using the idea of "compensation."

While Washington and forces like it deal with the crisis in NATO and fill the vacuum with the aid of "conventionalization," they will encounter economic limitations. In the United States and most other NATO member countries military spending is not growing, and is sometimes even shrinking. According to authoritative calculations in the United States this may lead to a 25-percent to 30-percent decline in the combat capability of non-nuclear forces by the early nineties.¹⁴ In some of the main West European countries (notably the FRG) a sharp decline has started in the number of individuals of draft age. In the FRG by the late nineties the shortages of these individuals will amount to 200,000 (given a Bundeswehr strength of 495,000).¹⁵

We think that the conclusions from this article are quite obvious. In the military-political field unprecedented opportunities have now been opened up (and they also exist in the purely political sphere) for initiating a process of radical reduction in the level of military confrontation in Europe and of eroding and ultimately eliminating the military division of Europe. A realistic assessment of the threat and of the opportunities and

decisive steps based on that assessment can guarantee an historic gain for peace, lead to the dismantling of the USSR's "Western front," and lay the foundation for a new and more stable and humane European order and for the creation of a peaceful "common European home" in which the countries of both West and East Europe would feel equally secure.

Another thing is obvious. The favorable prerequisites will not last forever. Sooner or later the vacuum that has been discussed may be filled. The situation of military confrontation in Europe will be reproduced at a new level. Only the Western part of this equation will change. It was will a greater West European component and a smaller U.S. one, and there will be more destabilizing new-generation conventional weapons.

It is clear that this kind of system of confrontation will threaten only a new increase in mistrust, ruinous for both sides in the arms race. The significance of the military confrontational factor will be maintained or even increased in European affairs. It will continue to disfigure European policy and hamper the expansion of really essential cooperation in all spheres. This, it is understandable, is in the interests neither of the USSR nor the interests of any other European state.

Footnotes

1. Ch. de Gaulle. "Memoirs of Hope: Renewal and Endeavor." New York 1971, p 201.
2. Cited in "Sovremennaya vnesnyaya politika SShA" [Present-day U.S. Foreign Policy], edited by G.A. Trofimenko, Vol 1, Moscow, 1984, p 313.
3. U. Nerlich. "Theater Nuclear Forces in Europe: Is NATO Running Out of Options?" WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Winter 1980, pp 110, 116.
4. "Salt II Treaty. Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations. U.S. Senate, together with Supplemental and Minority Views." Washington, 1979, p 228.
5. L. Sigal. "Nuclear Forces in Europe." Washington 1984, p 51.
6. J. Record. "NATO's Theater Nuclear Force Modernization Program: The Real Issues." Cambridge, Mass., Washington 1981, p 38. Similar assessments were made in an authoritative report from the Rand Corporation—the leading analytical center serving the Pentagon. See "NATO: Agenda for the Next Four Years." R-2836-FF, Santa Monica (California), "Rand Corporation," 1982, pp 112-113.
7. For further argumentation by Western experts on this issue see "NATO: Agenda for the Next Four Years." op. cit. pp 113-115.

8. See "United States Military Posture for FY 1982." Washington, Department of Defense, 1981, p 31.
9. C. Vance. "Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy." New York, 1983, p 64.
10. B. Lambeth. "The Political Potential of Equivalence: The View from Moscow and Europe." Santa Monica (California), 1978, p 22.
11. "NATO: Agenda for the Next Four Years." op. cit., p 117.
12. J. Record. op. cit., pp 47-48.
13. PRAVDA 27 May 1988.
14. "U.S. Conventional Force Structure at a Cross-roads." Washington 1985, p 2.
15. J. Dean. "Alternative Defense—Answer to NATO's Post-INF Problems?" Washington, Union of Concerned Scientists, 1987, p 7.

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09642

**'European Center' for NATO-WTO Cooperation
Proposed**

*PM0909133088 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
8 Sep 88 Second Edition p 5*

[Gennadiy Vasilyev "Viewpoint" article: "So It Must Be Prevented!"]

[Text] It will soon be a year since a Soviet-American agreement on setting up centers to reduce the nuclear danger and two protocols to it were signed in Washington. Time has shown convincingly how important and necessary this decision was and how organically it is linked to the developing process of real disarmament.

The national centers set up on the basis of this decision are functioning successfully in Moscow and Washington. Staffed with experienced specialists and equipped with facsimile communications, they are in constant contact via satellites. A new mechanism is in operation to give prompt notification of activity in the military sphere that could be incorrectly interpreted by the other side, which, in turn, could cause a stepping up of the nuclear threat. This offers additional opportunities to prevent and eliminate dangerous situations. The centers are used to convey notifications of ballistic missile launches and to "clarify" unclear situations that could cause concern to either side. They were recently enlisted to play an active part in the implementation of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles: Through the centers, information is exchanged and organizational questions connected with the activity of the inspection groups are resolved.

The nuclear missile age makes special demands, without historical precedent, on political and military leaders, who are responsible for the future of the world. The time available for making decisions in the event of a major crisis can be a matter of minutes. The cost of the decision is enormous. Accurate, speedy information is of key significance.

The Soviet-American agreement on setting up centers to reduce the nuclear danger "grew" out of the accord reached by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and U.S. President R. Reagan in Geneva in November 1985. It did not spring up out of nothing. Back in the seventies agreements were signed between the USSR and the United States on measures to lessen the danger of the outbreak of nuclear war and prevent incidents on the high seas and in the airspace. Let me remind you also that a hotline has been in existence between the USSR and the United States since 1963, for use by the two countries' leadership in emergencies.

Sufficient information on the international strategic situation generates trust, and trust promotes the attainment of accords on arms reduction. In the 12 months since the agreement was signed, the Soviet-American Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles was concluded and came into force and the two countries have made substantial progress in the cause of drafting an agreement on a 50-percent reduction in strategic arms. The agreement sets an example for other steps in the same direction. It would be useful, as the Soviet Union proposes, to set up a European center for reducing the military danger, as a place of cooperation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Operating on a permanent basis, such a center could become a useful structure to enhance the reliability of European peace. This, in turn, would promote the resolution of the urgent task of advancing to the substantial reduction of armed forces and conventional arms in Europe—from the Atlantic to the Urals.

The Soviet-American agreement on setting up centers for reducing the nuclear danger is one manifestation of the new political thinking that is becoming part of life. It is based on recognition by the leadership of the Soviet Union and the United States of the fact that there must be no nuclear war. And if nuclear war is unacceptable as an instrument of foreign policy, if it carries the threat of destruction for all mankind, then there is only one solution for the peoples—prevent it!

Letter Complains of Poor Training, Misuse of Reservists

*18010452a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
6 Jul 88 Second Edition p 2*

[Article by Maj O.Vladykin: "Without a Clear Purpose: A Letter with a Comment"; first paragraph is a letter, signed Col (Res) L.Borovskiy; second paragraph is a boldface introduction]

[Text] Dear Editors: Not long ago, I asked to be transferred to the reserve. This year, I was called up for the first time to attend commanders' courses for reserve officers conducted by the Moscow City Military Commissariat. Their low quality is astounding: the curriculum is poorly thought out and the military specialty of reserve officers is hardly taken into account, while our last positions on active duty are completely ignored. My impression is that if we were called up for active duty, they would use us as platoon commanders or, at best, signal company commanders, even though many of us have a wealth of practical experience in strategic command. If this is the situation in Moscow, imagine what goes on in the provinces. Signed: Colonel (Reserve) L.Borovskiy.

Our correspondent attended a class with the group of officers which included the author of this letter. The following is his account of what he saw.

Having checked off the names of those who came to class that day, the group's leader, Major General (Reserve) A.Mayorov, concluded:

"Our ranks have thinned, but there are still plenty of patient people around: the majority are still present."

This remark about patience, which I at first took to be a joke, appeared to me in a different light several minutes after the lecture began. Indeed, the class could barely tolerate the boredom that enveloped the classroom.

Major I.Korostelev, a chemical service specialist from the unit to which the group was attached, explained to reserve officers "special features of a signal company's mission of providing communications in the conditions of enemy use of weapons of mass extermination." He made no use of study aids, much less showed instruments or special equipment of any kind. The lecture's content also begged many questions. One of them was, in fact, asked at the end of the session:

"As a matter of fact, what are the special features of signal troops' mission?"

Major Korostelev clearly found the question confusing. Later, in a conversation with me, he confessed: "I got out of the hospital only yesterday and this is my first day on duty; I was sent to speak to reservists right away." Well, this may partially excuse the officer, but not course organizers. The students had many questions to them as well.

Indeed, how important can it be, to study the structure of a signal platoon as thoroughly as course organizers seem to want, to Colonel (Reserve) N.Labin, until recently a senior lecturer at the signal corps department of the Military Political Academy imeni V.I.Lenin? Or would it be news to Lieutenant Colonel (Reserve) V.Uskov, formerly a senior officer at the USSR Armed Forces' Office of Signal Command?

Naturally, the pace of change is rapid today and the troops, especially their technical equipment, constantly undergo modifications. But are those modifications significant enough to warrant teaching basics to officers who 1, 2 or even 3 years ago served in strategic command?

"The problem arises because the composition of the group is rather uneven," explained Colonel V.Koptelov, a representative of the Moscow military district's Office of Signal Command, who was conducting one of the classes that day. "Alongside officers who had long military careers, we have to teach those who received their officers' ranks in the reserve. The latter are in the majority in the group, and we have to set our standards by them."

These are important considerations. Yet, they are not indisputable, as it turned out.

"For many years I have been participating in various seminars and they always repeat the same things over and over again," said Senior Lieutenant (Reserve) K.Kozlov. "I have an impression they think that we do not have the slightest idea of the purpose, standard equipment and structure of signal units."

It turns out that it is not new technology or organizational changes that determine the content of the material taught to reservists at commanders' courses. What is it, then? Perhaps the emphasis is placed on reinforcing the knowledge of fundamentals?

"We have gone through training in our military specialty in college," said Senior Lieutenant (Reserve) S.Mishenkov. "In addition, at their civilian jobs, most engineers work either in communications or in radio electronics. I think that it would be much more interesting and useful to any one of us to hear about new developments in military communications than to go over basics."

This wish was partly fulfilled that day. Clearly, it would not be very hard to arouse reserve officers' interest for the classes if they were offered information that they could not get anywhere else but at commanders' courses. During Colonel Koptelov's lecture, there was not a single indifferent face in the classroom.

"For all classes to be conducted on this level," suggested Major General (Reserve) Mayorov, "the city military commissariat must make a very definite decision as to how it wants to use the reserve officers in the group if

they are called up for active duty. It may be worth while to consider dividing different specialists into separate study groups. In that case, it would be easier for the Office of Signal Command to develop appropriate curricula for different subgroups, taking into consideration specific requirements of each one, and to raise the overall level of the course."

12892

Results of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Readers Survey
18010452b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
6 Jul 88 Second Edition p 2

[Review of readers' letters signed Department of Letters and Work with the Masses: "It Is Up to Each One of Us..." under the "Readers on KRASNAYA ZVEZDA: Reactions, Opinions, Advice" rubric]

[Text] The 19th All-Union CPSU Conference has ended. Communists and the entire Soviet people awaited it with eagerness and hope. The proof of this is the mail we received in response to our "Express-Analysis" survey. Perestroyka was the main subject of the letters. But first, the results of the survey. As you recall, the June 3 questionnaire asked readers to assess 10 articles published during May that were judged the best by the editorial board.

Not every reader reads every article in the newspaper, of course. However, we were far from overjoyed when the survey found that almost 1 in 3 articles, on average, did not receive any comments. This means that it either was not read at all or did not leave a lasting impression. Given the fact that nearly everyone read the article by Captain 3rd Rank O.Odnokolenko "Narkom Kuznetsov", with 92 percent of respondents assessing it positively, the rest of the articles must have gotten even less attention from the readers.

We were glad to discover that the editors' opinion of articles "Following Bolshevik Traditions" (May 4) by Lieutenant Colonel Kosarev, "Glory Knows No Dead" (May 9) by A.Khorev, "To Get Rid of 'Second Person'" (May 14) by Captain 1st Rank V.Adazhiy and "Sons, Not Stepsons" (May 28) by Lieutenant Colonel N.Belan coincided with that of our readers who named them among the five best pieces.

Now, let us review our readers' letters. "Perestroyka uncovered a sea of problems," admitted Senior Lieutenant Yu.Marchenko. "The military has a lot of problems with it, I think. The reason lies in our special features: I feel that our natural and necessary one-man command principle imposes certain constraints on democratization and glasnost." Colonel (Reverve) V.Rybakov from Bryansk, expressed his opinion on the subject much more bluntly: "I feel that much of what is currently being said due to perestroyka is not acceptable for military

collectives. I hope that we are not going back to electing commanders nor will gun squads and tank and artillery crews, following the lead of civilians, be given 'soldiers' contract' on their machine guns, tanks or cannon." The author's style and sarcastic tone have been preserved here to provide a backdrop for the views of other readers.

"A mistaken, in my opinion, view has gained wide currency in the military," wrote Lieutenant Colonel (Guards) I.Koval. "It alleges that democratization undermines the foundations of the one-man command principle. I think that democratization is indispensable. A true, useful democratization would pull the rug from under favoritism and help promote better sergeants, ensigns and commissioned officers. The newspaper must assist this process in every way it can."

The Ukraine, where this letter came from, and the Transbaykal district, where Senior Lieutenant Podobed serves, are several thousand kilometers apart. But despite the geographical distance, the two officers share similar views. "Perestroyka in the military," thinks N.Podobed, "is a three-pronged process: it bolsters the one-man command principle, strengthens accountability for the performance of one's duties and, until the order is issued, encourages an open, honest discussion between superiors and subordinates, which helps avoid hasty, mistaken decisions. The first two problems are being addressed, but we have not learned to have discussions yet. Incidentally, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA is also short on polemical, thought-provoking pieces."

Lieutenant Colonel A.Osipov, Captain 3rd Rank N.Verbin, Major Yu.Rasskazov, Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) G.Kochanovskiy, Senior Lieutenant (Reserve) V.Selivanov and other readers also wrote about perestroyka, renewal and democratization. Their letters also expressed the idea of a constant superior-subordinate dialogue. Many suggested conducting this dialogue at all levels. "The commander at any level," wrote Senior Lieutenant (Guards) A.Skupovskiy, "should base his decisions on a thorough analysis of the opinion of the collective. He should seek more advice from his subordinates. I think that we must introduce public opinion surveys based on lively and informal discussions and secret as well as open polls. This should be the leading consideration in making staff and promotion decisions."

A number of letters stressed that the years of personality cult, and then of voluntarism and stagnation, have left an imprint on such intrinsically democratic military institutions as military soviets, officers' clubs and peer honor boards, gradually changing them from institutions of collective thinking into strictly bureaucratic bodies. As a result, concluded readers, democratization has to fight its way through management by administrative pressure, which, paradoxical though it may seem, has done much to undermine the reputation of one-man command as an extremely important and necessary command principle in the military.

"The broadening and development of democratic principles does not undermine the commanding officer's authority," wrote A.Ignatyev from Ventspils. "On the contrary, it is a means of reinforcing the one-man command principle, since only glasnost and scrutiny by the party can free this principle of various additional layers and ugly manifestations of the commanders' power.

What are we to do? Order a cavalry charge, raising unsheathed swords and yelling "Long Live Democratization!" or cool the reformers' zeal with a word of caution from the above-mentioned letter by Vladimir Andreyevich Rybakov: "The military has its own special features; replacing the old with the new should be done creatively, wisely and carefully."

More insistently than with respect to military command, the idea of intensifying and broadening the renewal was supported in relation to party activities. Here, too, when they addressed the questions of party work, many readers touched on the extremely sensitive subject of relationship between the commander and party organization. "Some commanding officers," wrote Captain M.Kiselev, "lean so much on the party organization and direct its activity so much that it becomes their obedient tool." The position of the party secretary elicited particular concern. Officers I.Korsakov and R.Zalyaliev claimed that service relations have evolved so that party secretaries are completely dependent on their commanding officers and superiors. Zalyaliev feels, for instance, that the system should be changed to allow the commanding officer to discipline or punish the party secretary only with the consent of the party organization. Korsakov thinks that "the party secretary should no longer be a subordinate of the military commander or the political officer of a unit or a subunit, but report to its superior party unit."

We received many similar proposals in June, both as part of our "Express-Analysis" survey and in our regular mail. This is natural, since at the time the discussion of the CPSU Central Committee's Theses for the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference was under way. We thank all readers who took part in the discussion. Many opinions and suggestions were published, and those we could not publish we passed on to the CPSU Central Committee or the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy.

The results and the first achievements of perestroyka interest many people. They want to know how great

these achievements are and how they manifest themselves. Many different opinions were expressed, but they all share a common theme, dissatisfaction. Colonel I.Dyakov, for instance, thinks that "perestroyka has touched only the surface of stagnation; it has not laid bare its deeper roots, has not shown the causes of stagnation phenomena." As though elaborating on the same idea, Captain Yu.Ganin, suggesting the theme "Why Is Perestroyka Spinning Its Wheels?", noted that in some areas perestroyka has been nothing but a "tightening of the screws."

Here are two sentences from these officers' letters, one as though continuing the other: "There is a need to develop a theory of perestroyka in the military, based on the laws of objective development of human society and would take into account main concepts and special features of the military..."

"There is a need for a constructive concept of perestroyka and an active effort to implement it."

Captain Golosov reproached this newspaper: "You are writing too little about those who are most successful in implementing perestroyka. I would like to read about such cases and, situation permitting, to visit them, to make sure that everything is just as you say." The fact that newspapers play an important role in publicizing the experience of perestroyka is supported by the reaction to our May 15 article by Captain 3rd Rank P.Ishchenko: "Experiment on the SS 'Smyshleniy.'" Captain A.Semenov thinks that the sailors' experience is relevant everywhere: "Partially, it can be adopted even by motorized rifle units. It is up to each one of us. And up to the newspaper, since we expect to see other articles on perestroyka there."

Express-Analysis Questionnaire

3. In your opinion, which urgent subjects and questions should KRASNAYA ZVEZDA raise in light of the discussion at the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference?
4. In addition to your surname, first name and patronymic, you age, place of work or military service and rank, please indicate how long have you been reading our newspaper, whether you are a subscriber and for how long, or prefer to buy it at the newsstand.

Fill out the questionnaire, clip and send to 123826 GSP, Moscow D-317, Khoroshevskoye Highway, 38.

12892

Tank Troops Day, 11 September 1988

CINC, Ground Forces Address

*LD1109215288 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1245 GMT 11 Sep 88*

[Address by Army General Yevgeniy Filippovich Ivanovskiy, commander in chief of the Ground Forces, USSR deputy minister of defense, and Hero of the Soviet Union, on the occasion of Tank Troops Day—live or recorded]

[Text] Esteemed comrades! The men of our armed forces and the entire Soviet country are today celebrating Tank Troops Day, for the 42d time. The motherland is honoring the courageous tank troops, manual and clerical workers, engineers and designers, and tank builders for their military services and achievements in creating and developing Soviet technology. Allow me, on behalf of the Ministry of Defense, the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, and the Military Council of Ground Forces, to ardently and cordially greet all tank crew servicemen, ranks and sergeants, warrant officers, officers and generals, all tank force veterans, all tank builders, and all of you, esteemed television viewers, on the traditional holiday of Tank Troops Day.

Tank troop servicemen are proud of the fact that Soviet people have regarded this branch of the forces with love and concern throughout its entire history. From the very first incredibly difficult 5-year periods, Soviet people handed over contributions to build tanks; while in the years of the Great Patriotic War they joined in the patriotic movement to collect funds to create not only armored vehicles but also entire tank columns.

The Soviet tank troops arose in the years of the civil war and have covered a heroic path of development. Their emergence is inseparably linked with the activity of the Communist Party and with the name of great Lenin. The foundations of Soviet tank building were laid on the instructions of the leader of the revolution. The first tank, named for freedom fighter Comrade Lenin, was created on 31 August 1920. Thus began our tank troops. They have traversed the path from the motorized armored detachments in the civil war period to the big tank formations in the Great Patriotic War. Soviet tank troops demonstrated combat power and courage as early as during the civil war and the foreign intervention, in the battles on the East China Railway, Lake Khasan, the Halhyn-sol River, and on the Korean isthmus.

During the years of the Great Patriotic War, tank troop servicemen covered themselves with unfading glory. The strength and might of tank strikes grew with every operation. The tank troops matured and acquired rich combat experience, and their prowess grew, in fierce battles against the German fascist occupiers. This prowess was demonstrated particularly strongly in the course of the Stalingrad and Kursk battles, and in the Korsun-Shevchenkovskiy, Belorussian, and Vistula-order operations, and in the battles for Berlin and Prague.

The tank troops distinguished themselves, too, during the rout of the Japanese Kwantung Army, achieving the legendary assault across the almost inaccessible Great Hsingan Ridge and the Gobi desert.

In the battles of the Great Patriotic War, which were unprecedented in scale and stubbornness, the remarkable moral, political, and combat qualities of Soviet tank crewmen were demonstrated, their loyalty to the motherland and to the cause of the party and people. A total of 250,000 tank crewmen were awarded orders and medals for courage and military prowess displayed on the war fronts, 104 became full holders of the Order of Glory, and over 1,000 were awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union; 16 of these were awarded this honor twice.

Hundreds of tank and mechanized units and formations were awarded orders and many were given honorary designations and turned into guards units.

Soviet tank builders made a great contribution toward achieving victory over the enemy. It is with gratitude that Soviet people speak the names of talented tank designers Mikhail Illich Koshin, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Morozov, Zhoszef Yakovich Kotin, Nikolay Leonidovich Dukhov, and pay tribute of great respect to the engineers and technicians, skilled workers and manual workers who created first class armored tank technology

In the exceptionally difficult conditions of wartime, our rear supplied the front with everything necessary for victory. During the years of the war, the Soviet Union produced twice as much weaponry and materiel as did Hitlerite Germany, for which the industry of the Europe it had enslaved worked. As symbols of combat glory and the labor heroism of Soviet people and of tank crews and tank builders, as a reminder of the incomparable courage of those fiery years, in our country and abroad hundreds of memorial tanks stand on pedestals, calling us to vigilance, development of sacred traditions, and readiness to multiply them.

Comrades, through the measures taken by our party, it has been possible to somewhat diminish the military threat in the world. But there is no total relaxation of tension. Imperialism has not repudiated the policy of military force. Plans are being worked out in NATO for compensation, for upgrading the bloc's armaments; they are calculating on achieving superiority over us by means of an asymmetrical—but essentially unilateral—reduction of the armed forces and armaments of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. We are, of course, obliged to take account of all this in our defense construction. The effectiveness of this must, in accordance with the directives of the 19th party conference, be ensured primarily by qualitative parameters, both in relation to technology and military science and in relation to the personnel of the armed forces. These, as you understand, are to guarantee the reliable security of the Soviet state and of its allies, and to be implemented strictly in accordance with our defensive doctrine.

We are striving to raise the fulfillment of the tasks confronting us to a qualitatively new level, to instill into servicemen a thrifty attitude toward everything that the people provide, to enhance the technical skill of servicemen, and to develop the knowledge of how to use equipment skillfully and to apply it effectively in any conditions or circumstances.

Thanks to the daily solicitude of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government, the continually increasing potential of the socialist economy, the great achievements of science and technology, and the selfless toil of Soviet people, the tank troops have advanced far in their development. There has been an immeasurable increase in the proportion of the ground forces which they form. There have been increases in armored protection, maneuverability, power, effectiveness of armaments, and improvements in other combat qualities.

Modern tanks have excellent armament, reliable protection against various means of attack, and high maneuverability and speed. High-precision observation and control instruments make it possible to drive the tanks in all conditions and to hit targets with certainty while on the move both by day and by night.

The composition of the tank troops includes motorized rifle, rocket, and artillery subunits and units, and subunits of air defense, engineering, and special forces. This makes it possible for the formations and units to make fuller use of their combat potential and gives our tank formations tactical and operational self-reliance.

However, the main strength of course consists of our tank troops. As you know, within the tank troops the crew of the combat vehicle is the primary service collective, where the foundations of high combat readiness of units and formations are formed. We therefore attach paramount importance to training and development of team work among the crews and subunits as a whole, although it needs to be stated forthrightly that service in the tank troops and their military tasks are difficult, as indeed is the case in other branches of the forces.

There has been an immeasurable increase in the significance of the human, moral, political, and psychological aspects. The best qualities of the Soviet tankman are formed in the course of the entire training and educational process and all army service, including purposeful party political work. We show constant concern for the ideological tempering of servicemen, the enhancement of their consciousness and political maturity, and instilling in them a sense of responsibility for the country's security and the reliable defense of the peaceful work of Soviet people and the great gains of socialism.

We are strict and demanding in our appraisal of what has been achieved, and we are firmly establishing a style of work which provides for increased quality in the tasks being tackled and the personal responsibility of each serviceman for the sphere he has been allotted, and we

encourage a creative search and innovative approaches to questions concerning the training and education of personnel. As the party demands, those servicemen who show their honest and conscientious attitude toward their service duty—not in words but in deeds—are being encouraged and elevated in every way.

The initiators of socialist competition among ground troops—the tank troops of the three-times honored regiment commanded by Colonel Yuriy Pakhomov—are carrying out their service worthily. The commander has been able to weld the servicemen into a united combat family and to promote the regiment among the front-rankers. There are good reports of the tank troops of the Proskurov-and-Berlin Order of Lenin, Red Banner and Order of Kutuzov guards tank regiment named after Grigorii Ivanovich Kotovskiy, which is renowned for its fighting for the homeland. The masters of accurate fire and tactical maneuvering include officers Viktor Pankratov, Leonid Boyko, Aleksandr Baymaratov, Valikhan Umarov, Petr Starostin, and many others. In every formation and every tank unit heroes of our times, those with excellent ratings in training, high-class specialists, and genuine masters of military work are living and serving. They are united by their constant concentration, high discipline, and personal responsibility for the reliable defense of our beloved homeland. Surely the exploits of the servicemen of the limited contingent of Soviet troops in the Republic of Afghanistan, who have been honorably fulfilling their patriotic duty in giving internationalist aid to the friendly Afghan people, are akin to those of the frontline!

As in the war years, Soviet tank troops are now turning their best thoughts and feelings to the Leninist party. We believe in the success of the foreign policy strategy being pursued by our party. But until Soviet peace initiatives receive the proper support from the imperialist states, the consciousness of Soviet servicemen is wholly and fully concentrated on further strengthening the defensive power of the homeland and on enhancing the vigilance and combat readiness of units and subunits. We are taught this by the experience of World War II, and this is demanded by the decisions of the 27th party congress.

Thank you for your attention.

Chief of Main Armor Directorate Interviewed
LD1109200788 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
0800 GMT 11 Sep 88

[From the "Time, Events, and People" program; interview with Lieutenant General Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Galkin, head of the Main Armored Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, by correspondent Aleksandr Abramov—presented by Natalya Vartanyan]

[Text] [Vartanyan] Today is Tank Troops Day. From armored motorized detachments and armored trains to

one of the main arms of the ground forces—such is the glorious path of development of the Tank Troops. And our famous T-34 was acknowledged to be the best tank during the war. A total of 1,142 members of the Tank Troops were awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union, and 16 of them won it twice over. Tank builders also made a great contribution to the victory; they gave to the front over 100,000 tanks and self-propelled artillery installations. And what of the modern tank troops? Our correspondent Aleksandr Abramov talks about this with Lieutenant General Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Galkin, head of the Main Armored Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense:

[Abramov] We know quite a lot about the role of the Tank Troops during the war: There was the famous battle near Prokhorovka, the march on Prague, and so forth. But what is the role of the Tank Troops in the modern army? We know that our doctrine now is a defensive one, yet I would have thought that the tank is an offensive weapon. Well, one could, of course, bury it in a trench up to the gun barrel, so to speak, but I do not think it was intended for that.

[Galkin] Well, on the political level, our military doctrine has always had a defensive orientation. In modern conditions it has simply been further developed. The main essence of the military-technological aspect of the doctrine consists in constant readiness to repulse any aggression and in ensuring immediate action in response. In regard to the second aspect of use of the Tank Troops, I would like to say that given the great striking power of tanks, tank units and formations are indeed to a greater degree intended for offensive operations.

[Abramov] And the speed of modern tanks is relevant here, too.

[Galkin] Indeed, modern tanks can attain speeds of around 50-60 km an hour in combat conditions. Here, though, I would like to dwell on examples from the Great Patriotic War. Starting from the Battle of Kursk—and there was Moscow and Stalingrad before that—there are many examples of using tank formations to hold defensive lines. That is, having a high level of armed protection, they make the defense able to withstand nuclear weapon strikes, air strikes, and in particular strikes by opposing tanks. Thanks to their high mobility, the defense becomes more active and maneuverable. A second quality that tanks have is this high level of maneuverability which, in conjunction with a high striking power, makes it possible to give them the task of destroying airborne assault landings. The third aspect is that the defenders' tanks, that is, second-line tanks, can be used to close up breaches or rapidly to replace first-echelon forces which have lost their combat effectiveness.

In a word, it seems to me that tank formations are capable of creating a stable screen in the shortest possible time, even on unprepared terrain and even immediately in areas where nuclear weapons are being used.

[Abramov] Thank you. I think that is convincing. Allow me to ask you a question about the future, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich.

[Galkin] Of course.

[Abramov] Now, if the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries come to agreement on reducing conventional weapons in Europe, we shall evidently have to reduce tank troops, shall we not?

[Galkin] Yes, of course.

[Abramov] We are now witnessing the reduction and elimination of medium-range missiles. And you know, when one sees on television or in cinema newsreels the cost of demolishing missiles, one thinks on the one hand that this is indeed a good thing; but on the other hand, the labor of magnificent engineers and workers is going up in smoke. What will happen to tanks if we come to agreement on eliminating them?

[Galkin] Well, as a tank crewman, I find it a bit unpleasant to talk about destroying tanks, because this holds....

[Abramov interrupts] It's your whole life, after all.

[Galkin] Yes, my whole life, and not only mine but that of many officers and many tank designers. But I can say just one thing; namely, that we shall not blow up and destroy our tanks. If this issue does indeed come up, and if we do indeed turn out to have surplus tanks, we shall of course cut them. But we plan to make use of our tanks for other purposes, in the interests both of the Ministry of Defense and of the national economy.

[Abramov] Yes, I wanted to ask you whether anything would go to the national economy.

[Galkin] Yes, if there is a reduction in the tank pool, we plan to transfer them to the national economy. For instance, the Ministry of the Timber Industry is asking for tanks to be used as fire engines for our eastern regions, where there are forests and where, unfortunately, one frequently comes across forest fires. This is one direction.

The second direction is to use our tanks—or more accurately the tank bases, without the tank turret weapon, of course—for road construction in the non-Chernozem Zone.

[Abramov] Well, this is your possible future, so to speak, and ours too. But to continue our conversation about the present day. Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, as you know, every high-ranking military leader who has spoken on the radio here has always spoken about the people of the branch of the armed services he represented. You will be no exception, I think, all the more so in that the profession of a tank crewman really is one of the most difficult in the Armed Forces, in our Army.

[Galkin] Thank you, Aleksandr Levovich. Well, first, I do not think I am a high-ranking military leader, but I nevertheless am pleased that you have asked that question, because we do indeed have such splendid people. We tank crewmen ourselves at one time learned by the example of front-ranking people and by front-ranking experience in the use of tank troops. We have splendid examples: Marshal Rybalko, Marshal Katukov, Marshal Polybayarov, Rotmistrov, Babadzhanyan, and other eminent Tank Troop commanders, whose experience we are still drawing on today.

And we have also learned from that experience, and we are trying to teach our successors, the young corps of officers of the tank forces. I can name today very many splendid people, good commanders and excellent professional tank crewmen, such as Colonel Anatoliy Ivanovich Grigorash, commander of a tank regiment, a delegate to our party's 27th congress, and a great master of combat proficiency. His regiment has been awarded the Challenge Red banner of the district military council for the last 5 years. I could name Major Nikolay Ivanovich Budayev, commander of a tank battalion, an enterprising and persistent officer in the fulfillment of the tasks imposed on him. He has fulfilled his internationalist duty in Afghanistan and has been awarded the Order of the Red Star; Anatoliy Nikolayevich Listopad, commander of a tank regiment, who has been awarded the Order of the Red Star and the Order for Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces for successful fulfillment of his internationalist duty, along with his regiment. And in the same regiment with him there is Senior Lieutenant Aleksey Aleksandrovich Goncharov, commander of a tank company; he is an enterprising officer, who constantly thinks not only about strengthening the company's combat readiness but also about the state of tank affairs in general. I would like to name Viktor Nikolayevich Yuryev, commander of a tank training platoon, a captain, a splendid educator of tank crewmen.

[Abramov] I shall be glad to present you with the microphone, because I think that you, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, have something to say for the holiday both to tank crewmen and to tank constructors, and simply to civilians. Go ahead.

[Galkin] I would like today to express great gratitude and say a big thank you to our workers, engineers, and designers, the creators of our tank forces, for their enormous contribution to the business of Soviet tank-building. They have shown, in the prewar, wartime, and postwar periods, that the Soviet school of tank-building is the best school of tank-building in the world. I would like to congratulate on this day all tank crewmen, both those who have seen action and those who have not, both the young and those who went through the Great Patriotic War, on Tank Troops Day, and to wish them strong health and great happiness.

Mobile Quadrant Antennas

81442988 Moscow TEKHNIKA I VOORUZHENIYE in Russian Jun 88 pp 20-21

[Article by Col (Ret) Ye. Klinshov and Candidate of Technical Sciences Lt Col G. Titov: "HF Antennas for Mobile Facilities"]

[Text] They can be theoretically divided into antennas for short-range communications using ground (surface) waves and sky waves and antennas for long-range communications (trunk lines over 1,000 km [kilometers]).

They differ in method of deployment as mast, low-set and roof (on-board) antennas. Tower antennas are deployed either on special supports 11 to 22 meters high or on local objects (trees, for example). Supports 2.5-3 meters high, a bush or the like are used for low-set antennas.

Various antenna-feeder devices are employed to provide for omnidirectional or wide-beam short-range communications using sky waves or ground waves (Figs. 1-4).




Fig. 1. Symmetrical dipole overhead-emissions mast antennas: a—horizontal vibrator (VG); b—slant vibrator (VN); c—slant frequency vibrator (VND); d—horizontal frequency vibrator (VGD); e—horizontal frequency shunt vibrator (VGDSh); f—loop frequency vibrator (VPD).




Fig. 2. Slant vibrator antennas in a T-shaped connection (a) and a frequency asymmetrical shunt vibrator with a counterpoise (b). Key: 1—antenna; 2—counterpoise.




Fig. 3. Rooftop AZIs: a—stub (ASh-4m or ASh-10m); b—dipole (DAZI); c—frame (RAZI); d—dual stub with two operating positions (ShAZI-2).




Fig. 4. “Slant Beam” type antenna (a) and a diagram of its directionality on the vertical (b) and horizontal (c) planes. Key: 1—antenna; 2—contact station; 3—counterpoise.

Symmetrical dipole antennas (mast and roof) can serve not only as overhead-emissions antennas (AZI), but also as non-symmetrical ones for ground-wave communications. VN, VG, VGD and VGDSh dipole feeders become the direct emitters therein, while their arrays use reactive loading, increasing the active heights of the antenna. The VPD-type antennas are an exception, as their arrays along with the metallic masts form asymmetrical frequency shunting vibrators. Their effectiveness is increased by increasing the number of counterpoises, as well as connecting the grounding grids to the mast footings. A natural counterpoise for T-shaped and stub antennas is the housing of the radio set (the body of the




Fig. 5. Diagram of antenna directionality (a—vertical plane; b—horizontal plane): 1—RAZI; 2—ShAZI-2 (inclined); 3—ShAZI-2 (vertical).

apparatus). An additional counterpoise or grounding circuit is connected to the housing of the radio set with the aid of a “Counterpoise” terminal.

All rooftop-mounted AZIs and “Slant-Wave” (NL) type antennas are employed for both ground- and sky-wave communications, that is they are combined-emitter antennas. The ShAZI-2 is the most effective of the rooftop antennas. Loop antennas are also quite widely employed in communications technology. The ShAZI-2 and the RAZI are thus equivalent in overhead emissions, but if such requirements as providing for long-range ground-wave communications (with a vertical stub positioning), mechanical strength and signal constancy when moving through woods, among others, preference is given to the ShAZI-2 (Fig. 5).

Mast antennas are principally employed on hardstands, and rooftop antennas are used just in an emergency. Their effectiveness at 6-20 db [decibels] is higher than rooftop ones if radio communications are carried out using sky or ground waves. The hook-up of mast antennas instead of rooftop ones, in other words, is equivalent to increasing transmitter capacity by 4-100 times and receiver sensitivity by 2-10 times.

In deploying mast antennas it is essential to take into account that the reliability of ground-wave radio communications is higher when the choice of antenna type is

closer to the optimal one and the counterpoise or grounding grid is better developed. The effectiveness of the utilization of symmetrical dipole antennas in this case largely depends on the crew's knowledge of the procedure for deploying them and the precision of the orientation to the contact station, as a result of which greater constancy in the signal level is achieved and the quality of the HF radio channel is better. We will consider these issues in more detail.

Dipole antennas in an asymmetrical circuit are the most efficient for ground-wave operations in the lower portion of the HF band (1.5-5 MHz), while ASh-10m (5-14 MHz) and ASh-4m or ShAZI-2 (14-30 MHz) stub antennas are more efficient at higher frequencies. Diagrams of the propagation of the radio waves on the horizontal plane are close to circular and take on some directionality only in the high-frequency portion of the band in the event the feeder of the T-shaped (as for an NL) antenna is inclined or when the emitter is located at the edge of a transport base (ShAZI-2). The NL antennas are efficient in the whole HF band with switchable (changeable) beam lengths and counterpoises. In this case, even a small directionality in their emissions can raise the power potential of the radio line, simultaneously worsening the conditions for DF bearings.

The significance of HF grounding of the radio sets in ground-wave operations should be noted. When they are deployed on wet ground, an electrical grounding of 3-5 metallic stakes is driven into the ground to 1 meter deep around the apparatus. On dry, rocky or frozen ground, it is expedient to utilize a counterpoise for HF grounding formed from a large number of wire clusters of length l_n less than or equal to $0.5 \times \lambda_{\min}$ (λ_{\min} is the minimum length of the working waves in meters); it is determined according to the maximum working frequency f_{\max} (MHz) according to the formula $\lambda_{\min} = 300/f_{\max}$.

The best antenna counterpoises contain several dozen clusters located at a height of no less than 0.5 meters. The number of clusters is reduced considerably and, furthermore, they are let down to the ground under field conditions in order to increase antenna mobility. This simplification leads to a decline in the antenna amplification factor, since it increases losses to ground. The power potential of the radio line is increased by 10 db and more (10 times or more by capacity) with the application of HF grounding nonetheless, even with a simplified counterpoise of 6-10 clusters. The application of HF grounding with portable shortwave radio sets produces an especially palpable gain.

When organizing HF ground-wave radio communications it is essential to take into account that the greatest communications distance is achieved in the low-frequency portion of the band (1.5-5 MHz), since the longer radio waves suffer less attenuation when propagating along the ground.

In a number of cases, HF radio communications can be accomplished with the aid of sky waves reflected off the ionosphere. This is connected with the fact that, first of all, it is impossible to sustain ground-wave communications at a great distance from the contact station or under mountainous conditions and, second, it is essential to make the enemy's opportunity for radio intercept more difficult (DF using sharply inclined reflected waves is difficult). The monthly radio forecasts should be taken into account when designating operating frequencies, otherwise an error in determining the receiving frequency band can lead to communications disruptions. (Conclusion to follow).

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12821

Performance of MiG-29 Discussed
18010457 Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian
17 Jul 88 p 6

[Article by V. Belikov and A. Perov: "The Soviet MiG-29 in English Skies"]

[Text] The fourth day of September will see the opening of the traditional Farnborough (Great Britain) International Air Show, in which the Soviet Union will demonstrate for the first time the MiG-29 fighter and the An-124 cargo transport. An interview of Soviet aircraft designers and industry leaders by *IZVESTIYA* correspondents follows.

IZVESTIYA: It was our practice for many years to exhibit civilian aircraft at air shows, even though it was no secret that our fighters were part of the air armaments not only of Warsaw Pact allies, but also of some Third World countries.

P. Belyakov, design project leader, MiG firm: We are already selling the MiG-29 to foreign countries. The international press is naturally well informed about this, but the world's technical community is not yet acquainted with the aircraft. You will agree that this is somewhat strange.

A. Batkov, administration chief, USSR Minaviaprom: We will demonstrate the MiG-29 as the answer to the U.S. F-15, F-16, and F-18 fighters.

M. Valdenberg, MiG-29 chief specialist: We have reason to believe that the MiG-29 is one of today's best frontal fighters in the world.

IZVESTIYA: You have anticipated the question of comparability.

M. Valdenberg: We are certain that our aircraft will be deemed completely comparable in the lineup of the latest aviation products. And we are not bothered by our intention to exhibit our new attainments, since ideas and designs are always ahead of existing models.

A. Batkov: This of course is also a question of information disseminated relative to the scientific and technical development levels attained in our country.

IZVESTIYA: The English *TIMES* has already mentioned that the MiG-29 will be present at the show...

P. Belyakov: Interest in MiGs is traditional. That is why we will demonstrate the MiG-29 in the air as well as on the ground, to show its flight capabilities in fullest measure.

M. Valdenberg: The MiGs will be flown to England by our firm's test pilots A. Kvochur and R. Taskayev. By the way, they are sufficiently fluent in English to maintain contact with air traffic controllers located in the countries they will overfly. They will be joined at Farnborough by Chief Pilot V. Menitskiy of the firm. So you see, we are sending to Farnborough a team of the highest class.

(The *IZVESTIYA* correspondents visit an Air Force unit in which pilots have successfully mastered the latest MiG-29. Situated in a far corner of the large military airfield are several covered shelters for the winged combat vehicles. In moments the duty flight pilots will assume their stations and taxi out for takeoff. In the meantime, we are conversing with Guards Senior Lieutenant S. Samko and his wingman, Guards Lieutenant V. Kovalskiy.)

S. Samko: The MiG-29 is the fourth fighter type I have mastered. Comparison is very favorable to the craft: supersonic speeds and splendid maneuverability; wonderful visibility and powerful armament capable of inflicting certain destruction on any air or ground targets. No wonder the aircraft is said to be the "fighter for winning aerial superiority."

Let me point out another feature: convenience, even comfort, in the cockpit. To lighten the load on the air warrior, the MiG-29 designers were successful in providing ease of control without the need for excessive pilot exertion. The aircraft obeys the pilot's commands even under overloads, when his hand assumes a weight of hundreds of kilograms. Skin temperatures during such maneuvers reach 100 degrees. An onboard air conditioner maintains a normal temperature in the cockpit.

In a word, I like to fly the MiG, even though I well understand that this is a formidable modern weapon. It is good that it is ours, but, as a Soviet person, I wish that the need does not arise for its use...

V. Kovalskiy: The craft makes it possible to perform such dazzling aerial maneuvers that it literally overturns all existing concepts of aerial duel tactics. The opponent is overwhelmed by the onslaught of maneuvers and by the speed at which you can assume the most advantageous attack position.

The MiG-29 is also capable of escorting at low speeds a transport aircraft or even a slow-flying helicopter. It can be of assistance to an aircraft in distress and lead it to a safe landing...

13005

**Problems of Certifying Medical Fitness,
Deferment of Draftees**
18010436 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
15 Jun 88 Second Edition p 2

[Article by Captain 3d Rank P. Ishchenko, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Declared Unfit for Service"]

[Text] K. Lyudmilla Ivanovna, as we shall call her, mother of a conscript, came to see us at KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. She related a story of conflict arising in connection with her son's call-up to active duty. It amounted to this. In spite of the fact that, according to our visitor, her son had a number of illnesses, the induction medical commission of the Severomorsk Military Commissariat declared him fit for military service. Lyudmilla Ivanovna disagreed and decided to pursue an illegitimate course of action—she lied about her son, telling a psychiatrist that he sometimes exhibits aggression and malicious behavior. Suddenly recollecting, she renounced her statement a few days later. The medical commission, however, had already decided to send the boy to a psychiatric hospital for evaluation.

"You cannot permit this," Lyudmilla Ivanovna said through the tears. "My son is so traumatized by what has happened. If I am guilty, let them punish me."

We are not going to focus on the rash behavior of the mother—others may judge the moral and legal aspects of that, we would suppose. But we will say straightaway that her alarm was not groundless. When, after a while, Severomorsk Military Commissar Lieutenant Colonel A. Gorbovskiy sent the conscript to a naval hospital for evaluation, all diagnoses were confirmed. Moreover, Colonel of Medical Service V. Kon, chief Northern Fleet psychiatrist, made one additional diagnosis—"psychiatric infantilism." Based on the latter, the hospital concluded that the individual was not fit for military service.

So we see that thanks only to chance was a mistake averted which could easily have come to pass. In other words, the mechanism designed to protect the army from conscripts unfit for service did not function properly.

At the same time, however, a fairly large number of our youth are declared unfit for service by our induction medical commissions. Colonel D. Yegorov, Murmansk Oblast Military Commissar, noted that every year a certain percentage of oblast conscripts is declared unfit for service due to their state of health.

I was shown several documents at the oblast military commissariat dealing with analysis of the state of medical health work. I quote from one of them: "Health center treatment does not entirely encompass our youth aged 15-16, a factor which leads to late discovery and treatment of their diseases. The number of conscripts transferred to the reserves as unfit for military service due to state of health is not decreasing."

In agreement with this is the appraisal given in the report of oblast health department director B. Tikhonov at a meeting in March of this year of military commissars and members of oblast induction medical commissions. It was noted specifically in the report that out of a thousand adolescents examined during the most recent health center check-ups, 762 cases of illness or disease were uncovered in Murmansk, 738 in Olenegorsk, and 667 in Lovozerskiy Rayon.

Why such a great number of disease cases?

"Six of the 15 oblast military commissariats do not have induction centers," replies Colonel Yegorov. "Therefore the quality of medical examinations in conjunction with registration and induction in the cities and regions where these are lacking suffers to a great degree. And if the quality of diagnosis is low, what then can be said about the quality of treatment?"

I. Savchenko, oblast health department deputy director, agrees with the oblast military commissar:

"The absence of an induction center complicates the work of the medical commission and has a negative impact on the identification of disease in our adolescents and youth."

A little comparative analysis is sufficient to convince one that this is true. Let us take three regions at random which do not have induction centers—Kovdorskiy, Lovozerskiy and Pechengskiy—and let us see what the dynamics of change shows here in fitness of young people for military service over the past two years. The number of individuals fit for duty decreased in 1987 as compared with the previous year by about seven, two and one percent, respectively.

Where are the medical commissions working when registration and induction are taking place?

"In the offices of the military commissariat," explains Lovozerskiy Rayon Military Commissar Major V. Sokolikov. "We are forced to yield our space to the doctors. The conditions are—see for yourself..."

One need not be a physician to realize how far working conditions for the doctors in the offices of the military commissariat deviated from normal. Here you have the area occupied by a stomatologist. It is not even an office—just an area partitioned off from the general corridor with a screen.

Major Sokolikov repeatedly raised the question of the need to establish an induction center—with V. Strakhov, first secretary of the party raykom, and I. Gordikov, chairman of the raispolkom. He did so most recently in the form of an official memorandum in February of this year. But not one of these appeals elicited a convincing

response. Nor did I obtain one when I brought up the very same question with deputy raispolkom chairman N. Brylev (the chairman was not available).

"Our budget is too small," he threw up his hands. "We don't have the money."

Alas, the universal reply of so many managers. We don't have the money! I am convinced that there will never be enough money if the raispolkom continues to view concern over the health of our youth as it must be exercised by the army as a third-priority task.

But should we be amazed at the position taken by the regional authorities if a similar example can be taken from their experience? Colonel Yegorov twice petitioned the oblispolkom chairman, Yu. Balakshin, to allocate space at the induction center in the Pervomayskiy Rayon of Murmansk, one of the largest in terms of population. The reaction of the oblispolkom was silence.

Is it possible that the oblast, rayon and city ispolkoms are not aware of the resolutions obligating them to provide premises to military commissariats, including premises for induction centers? I would find that difficult to believe. Here we are talking about blatant disregard for requirements, about a reluctance to follow directives.

The saddest thing about this is the fact that in some places this kind of attitude passes on to the physicians. Let us look again at Lovozerkiy Rayon. During registration last year illnesses were uncovered here in 12 pre-conscripts. By April of this year not one of them had been treated.

In the sake of fairness it must be noted that objective difficulties do confront the Lovozer doctors in their work. In particular, there exists neither an office nor medical position for treatment of adolescents.

"We discover illnesses and diseases only during registration and induction," complains V. Kalinskiy, the city hospital's deputy chief physician.

"Because there is no authorized slot for a doctor to treat adolescents, medical health treatment of pre-conscripts is conducted basically on paper. Often conscripts requiring treatment are sent off to military service in that condition," Sokolikov explained.

There is no provision in Lovozer for an adolescent doctor because the number of adolescents in the region falls short of the standard—1500 individuals. Clearly this norm does not correlate with conditions in a region which occupies more than a third of the oblast territory. Nor does it conform to conditions in the oblast as a whole—where a low population density makes the existing standard too great. This is what many oblast health care personnel believe.

Here we must make another observation. Among physicians the position of adolescent doctor is not considered prestigious—the workload is great, entails a lot of paperwork, and one's skill qualifications diminish. The position often stands vacant long periods of time since it is temporary people who occupy it. Over a five-year period in Severomorsk there was a turnover of seven adolescent doctors. In 1986 the number of pre-conscripts for which illness and disease were uncovered during registration reached a record high—64 percent. The situation changed drastically when a new doctor, Valentina Nikolayevna Bryukhanova, an extremely conscientious individual, arrived to fill the position. This year during the conduct of registration, health deviations from the norm were uncovered in 12 percent of the youth.

When is the foundation laid for the health of a conscript? Certainly not in the final year or two prior to service. This is why the children's polyclinics must share responsibility for each young person not accepted for service due to medical reasons.

I was informed at the oblast health department and oblast military commissariat that these polyclinics do not come close to fulfilling their potential in providing children's health care. The point at which flaws in children's medicine become most readily apparent is when 14 and 15 year-old schoolchildren are transferred from the children's polyclinic to adolescent care. Last year when this transfer took place in Severomorsk, 32 cases of illness or disease—including chronic gastritis—were immediately diagnosed. The children's doctors never even suspected these illnesses. How can this be? Chief physician Yu. Rychkova, who is partly in agreement with the criticism directed towards the polyclinic, offers some justification—the positions of surgeon and neuropathologist have been vacant two years.

Yuliya Aleksandrovna states she addressed her supervisors many times on the matter of bringing the medical staff up to strength but the issue remained unresolved for an unacceptably long period of time. Another factor is the polyclinic's need for "housing." Presently it doesn't even have a main building—it is broken up into three unequal parts dispersed in various sections of the city. But the authorized position listing does not take this into account. The doctors have to literally split themselves up. Up-to-standard medical care?!

And there is another problem no less important. Small children in Severomorsk are sick frequently and for long periods of time due to the fact that the pre-school institutions are over-packed.

As we can see, there is no lack of problems in providing medical care to oblast youth. And we can have little confidence that these will be resolved in the next few years. We have the impression that the Murmansk oblispolkom and oblast health department have not outlined a clear-cut program for handling the situation, have not determined the outlook. Periodic meetings and

conferences, as well as decisions made, have had little effect on the heart of the matter. Fundamental measures and energetic action are needed here. Yet for some reason they are lacking. It was thought that a conversation with the oblispolkom first deputy chairman, A. Dubrovin, might shed some light on the subject, but he could not find an opportunity to meet with this correspondent. In the meantime a number of questions remain which, it appears to me, demand immediate resolution.

Here is one of them. A majority of young people are not accepted for military service or receive a restricted fitness profile due to poor vision. Accordingly, a significant percentage of Severomorsk conscripts have restricted qualifications for service with one or another service or branch of the armed forces due to defects in their vision. We see pretty much the same thing in the other cities and rayons of the oblast. And the situation

gets worse every year. Can we afford to continue temporizing? Perhaps we need to develop a "Vision" program coordinated oblast wide which would provide a package of organizational, preventive and curative measures directed towards preserving children's eyesight, beginning at the very earliest ages. This idea is supported by certain physicians.

Yes, there are a great number of people engaged in intensive thought as to how to afford our country and the armed forces healthy and robust replacements. They need help and support in coordinating their efforts. They will get it, and there will be results.

Incidentally, if the psychiatric infantilism of conscript K. had been diagnosed two or three years ago, according to psychiatrists, he would have been entirely able to reach the level of development of his peers. And, of course, to be selected for military service...

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Gerasimov Responds to Bush on Soviet 'Base' in Syria

LD1209141988 Moscow TASS in English 1410 GMT 12 Sep 88

[Text] Moscow September 12 TASS—The Soviet Union welcomes the results of the just-ended conference of the foreign ministers of non-aligned countries, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov said here today.

Gerasimov, chief of the ministry's Information Directorate, was speaking at a briefing for Soviet and foreign correspondents.

"The forum in Nicosia has borne out that the Non-aligned Movement is one of the more authoritative political movements of the times," he said.

"It has affirmed itself as a viable alternative to the policy of blocs. The final documents of the conference, including the Nicosia declaration, meet the requirements of the times and testify to the movement's desire to continue being actively involved in world affairs."

Commenting on the claim made by U.S. Vice-President George Bush at an annual session of the American Legion that the Soviet Union allegedly has a military base in Syria, the spokesman said the information is not true and this has been pointed out at news briefings more than once.

"As far as Syria is concerned, Soviet ships call at the port of Tartus for small-scale repairs and for victuals. We have a floating repair shop, temporary wharf, parking lot and storage area in the port.

"The main thing is, however, that the Soviet Union does not have any warships in the port on a permanent basis," Gerasimov stressed.

Commenting on a recent visit by Lord Plumb, president of the European Parliament, to the USSR, he said: "The Soviet Union is prepared to develop ties with the European Parliament in every area and unequivocally recognizes the importance and utility of such contacts both in terms of mutually advantageous exchanges of views and information and from the standpoint of fostering a political atmosphere felicitous for furthering interparliamentary dialogue on the key issues of European policy."

Answering a query from a reporter, Gerasimov said an event called "Estonian Song'88" took place on the singers' field in Tallinn, Estonia, on September 11.

Sponsored by the provisional organizing committee of the Popular Front and the Estonian Temperance Society, it was attended by more than 200,000 people from all over Estonia to hear patriotic national songs sung by choirs and other performing groups as well as speeches by well-known politicians of that Baltic republic, the spokesman said.

He said that Estonian national symbols were in evidence and that people also were holding streamers and posters demanding that Estonian [as received] be declared the republic's state language and that citizenship of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic be instituted and supporting a scheme under which the republic will go on a full-scale self-accounting economic basis.

The festival was attended during its first part by Vajno Vaelaas, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Estonia.

Paper Views Development of SDI Lasers

PM0809133188 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Sep 88 First Edition p 3

[M. Ponomarev "Observer's Notes": "Laser Flashes at White Sands"]

[Text] The U.S. periodical DEFENSE NEWS reported recently that the Perkin-Elmer corporation has won a contract to manufacture free-electron laser guidance apparatus. This apparatus will be used during an experiment with a prototype earth-based laser planned for the early nineties at the White Sands (New Mexico) test range. Lockheed Missiles and Space is the main subcontractor in carrying out this experiment. It has already received \$179 million for preparatory work.

The fact that this report arrived on the eve of the third anniversary of first test of a laser installation developed under the "Strategic Defensive Initiative" program at White Sands is obviously coincidental. But the zeal shown by the organizers and operators of SDI can in no way be called coincidental. They cannot wait for the moment when strike weapons—the very weapons that are more often called "Star Wars" weapons in the United States—appear in space orbit.

I would remind readers (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has already written about this), that 3 years ago, on 6 September 1985, a Titan-2 ICBM casing was hit by a laser at the White Sands range. This experiment was accompanied by a large-scale propaganda and advertising campaign. Pictures taken at the range were shown on television and upbeat reports printed on the front pages of newspapers. Lieutenant General J. Abrahamson, director of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO), which was monitoring the tests, expressed open excitement about the results. In his words, it was a very impressive sight.

It later transpired that such assessments were rather exaggerated. The experiment was held in what were by no means war conditions. Atmospheric conditions were ideal. The target—the missile casing—was stationary. It was in an upright position and was a comparatively short distance (less than 1 km) away from the laser installation. Nonetheless, the boosting campaign played its part. The SDIO obtained funds to continue work on lasers of various types and for various roles. Yet another Titan-2

missile was destroyed. The Air Force tested the laser against a target aircraft, the ground forces used a laser device to hit surface-to-air missiles, and the U.S. Navy experimented with a laser device that made it possible to illuminate a missile in flight. And at the end of last year a powerful new laser working in the infrared range was tested at White Sands. The Defense Department reported that it had successfully hit a missile in flight.

The laser devices discussed above are chemical lasers. In particular, the Titan missiles were "hit" by hydrogen fluoride lasers. But together with this ever-increasing scale, work is being conducted on the creation of combat lasers of a fundamentally different type—the so-called nuclear-pumped X-ray lasers. It is on this type of laser that the proponents of SDI—above all, E. Teller, who is called in America the "father of the hydrogen bomb"—are pinning their hopes of creating an antimissile defense with space-based elements. His reports to the President on the potential to create a "superweapon" based on an X-ray laser formed the basis of R. Reagan's well-known speech which initiated the "Strategic Defense Initiative."

True, proof that Teller's assessments were highly exaggerated is now becoming public. Although extremely active work is being carried out on an X-ray laser—underground nuclear tests have even been held in relation to the project—there is still a long way to go before it is actually implemented. But the not-yet-born brainchild of Teller and his assistants from the Livermore National Laboratory has already played its part as a detonator for the "Star Wars" program. The work to implement this program is becoming ever broader in scale and the pace of the work is constantly increasing. Billions of dollars are annually allocated for these purposes.

Thus, reports have appeared about definite progress in creating laser weapons systems and in research to create electromagnetic guns. It is planned to use these weapon systems within the SDI framework. The McDonnell Douglas corporation is pushing ahead with work on antimissile missiles to destroy warheads in their reentry phase. Together with airborne missile complexes, they are meant to be the final layer in an ABM system with space-based elements. Research is under way which should lead to the creation of a system of infrared instruments able to locate an ICBM before it enters the denser layers of the atmosphere. A nuclear reactor is under development, as is a special system utilizing solar radiation, to power space strike arms.

The danger of the "Star Wars" program has repeatedly been stated. Putting weapons in space will inevitably lead to a growth in mutual distrust and suspicion. It will make the world less stable and less predictable and will whip up the arms race. Mankind's fate will be increasingly dependent on chance technical faults. Here it is appropriate to recall the terrible mistake committed by the much-vaunted "Aegis" air defense system fitted to the U.S. cruiser "Vincennes," which led to the destruction of an airliner and its 300-odd passengers. "A space-based strategic

defense system," SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN writes with alarm, "will be even more prone to mistakes in target identification than was the 'Vincennes.'"

Here the allegations so widely trumpeted in Washington that SDI is purely defensive in nature are no help. They were unexpectedly refuted by none other than former Pentagon chief C. Weinberger. In the Japanese newspaper SANKEI SHIMBUN, he literally stated the following: "If the Soviet Union acquires SDI, that would mean it would be able to inflict a first strike, and our response would be considerably weakened or eliminated altogether."

Yes, the essence of SDI lies precisely in the fact that it creates the illusion that a nuclear first strike with impunity is possible—and that is its greatest danger to all mankind. Nonetheless, not only the current Washington administration, but those Republican Party figures who are counting on taking over from the administration continue blindly clinging to it. Both presidential hopeful G. Bush and vice presidential hopeful D. Quayle make no bones about the fact that they are fervent supporters of the speediest deployment of SDI. On the contrary, they even emphasize this in their campaign speeches.

The Soviet-U.S. ABM Treaty is an obstacle to transferring the arms race to space. That is why it is a target of furious attacks from SDI supporters. The fundamental position with regard to the need to observe the ABM Treaty and not abandon it was worked out during the Washington summit and reaffirmed at the Moscow summit. However, there has been no progress at the Geneva talks, where a draft agreement on this subject is supposed to be worked out. The reason for this is the U.S. side's approach. Advocating a "broad" interpretation of the treaty, it is to all intents and purposes working to undermine it for the sake of retaining SDI.

Pustov Highlights World Opposition to U.S. Military Bases

18010358 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
17 Apr 88 Second Edition p 3

[Article by Vasiliy Pustov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA columnist: "The Reason for U.S. Bases. The People Strongly Oppose American Military Dominance. The Myth About 'The Soviet Threat' Is Disintegrating. The Fatal Consequences of the Pentagon's Basing Strategy Must Be Prevented."]

[Text] The signing in Geneva this week of the Afghanistan agreement is rightly at the center of world public attention. The documents on the political settlement with respect to Afghanistan represent the first model of a peaceful resolution of regional conflicts and crises on the basis of the principles of the new political thinking. A reasonable compromise has been reached that meets the supreme interests of peace and international security.

The Geneva agreements are called upon to put an end to outside interference in the affairs of Afghanistan. Only the people themselves can determine their own fate without any foreign pressure.

However, this week turned out to be filled with events of another kind. They are associated mostly with the dangerous U.S. military presence on foreign soil. The Pentagon has at its disposal almost 1,600 bases and other military installations in 34 countries and their possessions where more than a half million servicemen are stationed. Everyone knows their purpose: to create a military threat to the socialist states and the nonaligned countries, whose people have chosen the path of independent development; to support antipopular pro-American regimes, against whom local patriotic liberation forces are fighting, and to bring pressure on the governments of countries in which American bases and garrisons are located so that they conduct a policy favorable to Washington.

This kind of pressure is continually seen in many countries where U.S. military dominance is becoming more and more intolerable for the local population. American solicitation to preserve and even to strengthen its military presence; for example, in Mediterranean countries—Spain, Italy, Greece and Turkey—serves as a clear example of this. An especially tense situation has arisen in this context in Panama and the Philippines. These countries are located in different parts of the planet, but there is a lot in common in their destiny. Both have been subjected to occupation more than once by American troops. Inequitable treaties, which resulted in an American military diktat, were imposed by Washington on both countries.

About 10 American military installations have been built up in the Philippines, among which are the Subic Bay naval base and Clark Field air base. Their garrison consists of approximately 40,000 servicemen and family members. A 10,000-man garrison, deployed on more than 20 bases and other military installations, is stationed in Panama permanently. Its presence there is motivated "by the necessity to guard" the Panama Canal which is operated by the Americans.

Both countries have a special strategic significance for the Pentagon. Subic Bay and Clark Field are considered to be the most important American bases outside the United States. They serve as the main connecting link in the Pentagon's system of base operations, which stretches from the western U.S. seacoast to Southeast Asia and East Africa. According to the views of Pentagon strategists, the Philippine bridgehead makes it possible to pose a direct threat to countries of Southeast Asia, and to maintain control of the Malacca Strait, which connects the Pacific and Indian oceans and which clears the way for American interventionist forces to the oil-rich area of the Persian Gulf, which, as is known, is included in the sphere of U.S. "vital interests." As for Panama, its importance is determined not only by the canal, which connects the Pacific and Atlantic oceans. The U.S. Southern Command,

located in this country, as was acknowledged by General P. Gorman, its former commander, is "the guard of U.S. interests" in all Latin America.

This is the reason why, at a time when in these countries and, by the way, in many other countries, not only the people, but also the governments influenced by them, are aspiring to achieve greater self-dependence and independence, that Washington is trying everything to preserve its strategic and other positions. Our newspaper has reported in detail what specific objectives it is striving for in Panama. However, the development of events shows that neither Washington's severe economic sanctions, threats and buildup of American forces, nor counting on internal Panamanian reaction could bring the people of Panama, its government and National Defense Forces (SNO) to their knees. Each day brings evidence of their resolve to continue the fight for freedom and national sovereignty. To continue the fight for the fulfillment of the American-Panamanian treaties signed in 1977 on the full transfer of control over the Panama Canal by the end of this century, including questions of its management, protection and defense. That is, that which U.S. ruling circles would now like to repudiate.

Washington is now seeking a pretext for aggression against Panama, inciting incidents on military bases in the Canal Zone. The National Defense Forces are taking all measures not to be drawn into provocative acts. Under conditions of an increasing risk of a direct American armed invasion of Panama, according to information coming in, distribution of weapons to citizens of the country and their training in military matters has begun.

An alarming situation has also arisen in another part of the globe—in the Philippines, where this week Philippine-American negotiations on the status of U.S. military bases on the territory of the archipelago have been resumed. It will be recalled that the negotiations on the Philippine side are being conducted by statesmen who came to power relatively recently—many years after a one-sided basing treaty was imposed on the country. Many of these officials look at these bases as bastions of American colonial supremacy and as a factor that undermines confidence in the statement of Manila that the Philippines are a neutral and nonaligned country. The Filipinos do not want to accept the fact that foreign military bases are maintained in their country—the only one in Southeast Asia.

Manila could not help but take notice of the appearance of a new international factor of exceptional import—the Soviet-American treaty on the elimination of medium range and lesser range missiles, which creates favorable conditions for advancement along the road to real disarmament. "Philippine officials have declared," THE WASHINGTON POST newspaper recalls, "that the RSDM [INF] Treaty, signed last year by Soviet leader M. Gorbachev and President R. Reagan, will reduce to zero the need for American military bases for the the neutralization of the 'Soviet threat' in Southeast Asia." The

profuse talk issuing from the U.S. about "the threat" is also refuted by representatives of a number of other countries of the Asian-Pacific region. Thus, U. Hayden, Australian minister of foreign affairs and foreign trade, while recently visiting Manila said to journalists after meeting with President Corazon Aquino: "We do not see any kind of threat on the part of the USSR."

The Philippine public is raising the alarm, and it is also turning its attention to the ruinous influence of U.S. military dominance from the standpoint of the moral and ethical damage inflicted on the population. As THE WASHINGTON POST notes, specialists on social problems think that it is the fault of American servicemen that prostitution has spread around these bases and that the number of those ailing from SPID [AIDS] is increasing. "I think," Letitia Shakhani [sic], chairman of the senate foreign policy committee, apparently concludes, that "sooner or later these bases will have to be eliminated. . . At some point we will have to cut the umbilical cord all the same."

It seems that the term "umbilical cord" was not used accidentally. This metaphor makes sense. The fact is that the U.S. pays the Philippines 180 million dollars annually for the military bases, which is also used by Washington as a lever to pressure the Philippine government. Observers have turned their attention to the statement of Philippine Minister of Foreign Affairs R. Manglapus that annual payments on the order of a billion dollars would be "a more realistic" sum. The significance of the haggling is clarified by the fact that the issue in ongoing negotiations is not about whether there will or will not be American bases, but only about the next review of the conditions for their presence on Philippine soil.

This time negotiations on the review are far from going smoothly. The Philippine side demanded changes in the text of the treaty on bases that would obligate Washington to request approval from the Philippine government

for the deployment of missile weapons on these bases, and also to inform Manila beforehand about the initiation of combat operations and the conduct of maneuvers. Along with this, the Philippine congress is considering bills that provide for a ban on the import and storage of nuclear weapons in the country.

Judging by everything, Washington did not limit itself to demonstrations of sharp displeasure. Measures were taken there in good time to broaden support for its proteges on the archipelago. The coincidence in time between the difficult negotiations about bases and the activization of subversive activity by a group of pro-American thinking officers who threaten the government with a coup cannot be considered accidental. As in Panama, the local reaction to please the American benefactors is ready to play the disgraceful role of a "fifth column."

The force of the treaty on bases in the Philippines expires in 1991. However, military circles in the West are already now alarmed over the fate of these nests of aggression. As the London newspaper TIMES notes, the loss by the Pentagon of the Subic Bay and Clark Field bases will be a blow not only to the U.S. but also to NATO as a whole, inasmuch as it will deprive the West of influence "in this potentially unstable part of the world."

The conclusion of the INF treaty and the signing of the agreement on Afghanistan attest to the fact that the new political thinking is steadily making headway. The swiftly growing intercommunication and interdependence of the contemporary world dictates the need to take steps that would prevent the ruinous consequences of a militaristic policy. No matter where or in whatever "peripheries" such a policy would be conducted. This in full measure also concerns the Pentagon's dangerous basing strategy.

Letters on Perception, Treatment of Afghan Vets
18010274a Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 22 Jul 88 p 2

[Letters from the "Readers Continue the Discussion" section: "The Attitude Toward the Soldier"; first two paragraphs are KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA introduction]

[Text] We are continuing to publish responses to Ye. Losoto's reporting from Afghanistan entitled "An Official Trip to the War" (see: KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 23 to 28 February).

The initial topical selection of responses ("Women in War") was published on 14 June 1988. Today readers are reflecting our attitude toward soldiers.

[Letter from S. G. Olada, Rostov-On-Don]

I want to sincerely thank you for the report "An Official Trip to the War" which gave the specific conditions under which our soldier-internationalists are operating. This article describes things that haven't been in print before. These reports were not ashamed to call those heartless bureaucrats and red-tape pushers the very name that they deserve. I would say that they are not simply "fools," but also "scoundrels." This is what you must call them for sending out rotten potatoes and demanding photographs be taken of exploded vehicles when the enemy is still around, everything is mined and the terrain is under enemy fire.

In a tactical sense the lads in Afghanistan have it more difficult than did we, the participants in the Great Patriotic War, especially in 1943-45 when we had superiority. The front-liners of those days were primarily mature people who had been tempered through their work and made wise by life's experiences. In a psychological sense it was simpler then because there was no question of "Why me and not him?". The entire country and all its people were at war and everyone enjoyed the same fate.

The report convincingly shows that these soldier-internationalists must be given that same intense attention and great respect and must be given as much concern as possible, both while in Afghanistan and when they return to the Motherland. We cannot allow them to knock on every door of the various offices in order to get their deserved privileges. It is distressing to hear about and read that invalids who have returned from Afghanistan are looking for crutches, prosthetic devices and carriages and are having to wait for years to obtain living quarters.

We must radically change society's attitude toward servicemen, the Army, the defenders of the Motherland. In pre-war years passengers on city transportation offered their seats to servicemen and the sign "Military personnel do not have to wait in line" was stenciled in stores

and ticket offices. Those who had returned from the army were offered the best work positions. I myself had occasion to hear people in line say "Salesman, let the soldier go ahead."

And now? Where is our love and respect for these defenders of the Motherland?

Our society does not attach any importance to the fact that our servicemen in security detachments and at PVO [Air Defense] sites and all other locations are not on their own, but belong totally to the service. Their work day is not of normal length and the soldier is found where he has been ordered to go. Whether he wants to go or not is of no importance.

We must elevate the prestige of the Army and service in its ranks.

[Letter from A. K. Faine, Seshcha Postal Area, Dubrovskiy Rayon, Bryanskaya Oblast]

I cannot understand why one can find Great Patriotic War veterans who do not want to recognize the soldier-internationalists who have carried out their sacred duty as part of the Limited Contingent of Soviet Soldiers in Afghanistan.

Soldier-internationalists in Afghanistan are being given their certificates for taking part in the war and for being war veterans and are being granted privileges for taking part in the war and for being invalids. These benefits are being given to them just as they were to those who took part in VOV [the Great Patriotic War]. But the sad thing is that there are some who do not realize the horrors of the war in Afghanistan. The heroism displayed by our soldiers in Afghanistan has proven that our young people are worthy of their fathers and grandfathers.

Our soldier-internationalists have shown courage, staunchness, daring and self-control under extreme conditions.

It is possible that we have this attitude toward them because very little is being written or told about Afghanistan, there is little literature available and there are few people who know the real truth about Afghanistan.

[Letter from L. Golovatskiy, a participant in VOV and a veteran of labor, from Chimkent]

I took part in the Great Patriotic War and I am totally convinced that it is irrational and a mistake to measure participation in a war only by how long it continues or how major the war might be. A war is a war. One lives through it from start to finish, is alive and healthy and it is nothing. Others, such as Matrosov or Gastello, were in the war for only a few calendar days—but does this reduce their immortal feats?

What difference does it make to the soldier (and here I am thinking about all soldiers and all ranks) if he takes part in a major or minor war? Or if he is wounded or killed in a major or minor war?

Dear countrymen, do our young men in Afghanistan have it easier or more free than we did on the fields of our great war? Do soldiers who have died in Afghanistan have yet another life in reserve? Are the mothers of the maimed and killed woven from some other material and do the wives and fiancees have other impulses and feelings than did our mothers and fiancees of that past great war. Certainly not, a thousand times no!

Then one must ask why there is room among us for indifference toward our "veterans from Afghanistan"?

[Letter from Ye. A. Bukin, a 39 year old engineer from Tashkent]

I am developing a strange picture from the reports that I have been able to get. Everyone knows that there is a war in Afghanistan and yet people react to it as if it were something casual.

Local television recently showed soldiers sitting in an airport. They had returned from Afghanistan and were forced to endure four days at that airport!

I think that we are not the only ones with this attitude. Society has still not reached that critical point. Apparently people are still not aware that these soldiers are defending our interests. We must get to the point where our "Afghan veterans" are not ashamed of their awards and where everyone treats them like heroes.

[Letter from N. L. Alferov, Shchelkovo, Moscovskaya Oblast]

The severe and bitter truth about our soldiers' and officers' service.

Pilots risk their lives delivering fruit and vegetables, 50 percent and more of which are rotten. And wouldn't it be fair to recommend that those people who provide such managerial assistance accompany these "presents" in flights over Afghanistan. Let these bureaucrats look at these "spirits" and "black tulips" and after that, if they are lucky and return alive, they will lose their desire to feed our servicemen such rotten presents.

And if we are still not in a position to manufacture a decent sleeping bag for our soldier, we don't have to feel self-conscious, but should buy them abroad where there is apparently a higher concern for servicemen. Yes, from all appearances, Afghanistan has uncovered many shortcomings in providing our forces with the domestic niceties without which one cannot fight for long.

Yet it could be worse. Instead of taking photographs they could have them collecting metal from destroyed vehicles.

[Letter from Yelena Tatarchenko, Yakutiya]

There are also lads here in the North who have gone through the crucible of Afghanistan. But what are our attitudes toward them? Here is an example. Here is a line for goods that are in short supply. There are two war veterans. One was in the VOV and the other took part in the war in Afghanistan. While letting the VOV veteran pass through the line without comment, people looked at the veteran of the Afghan war and began to state their opinions about his service. And the man who had fought in Afghanistan was not able to make his way to the counter through those words, for they seemed to wound more severely than enemy bullets.

I want to bow down to our soldiers who have gone through the severe trials and to those who are still there in Afghanistan and pay tribute to their courage, their long patience and their high sense of duty!!! Thank you all!

[Letter from O. M. Kravchenko, Voroshilovgrad]

And why are we forgetting the soldiers who served in the Internal Forces in Kiev and were put in to establish order and calm the people on that first day of the accident at the Chernobyl Atomic Energy Station? The soldiers were in hell itself for three or four days while carrying out their duty to the Motherland and they received large doses of radiation.

After demobilization, the amount of radiation that they received was annotated on their military cards and that was that. They were registered when they returned home and that was all. But what about their health? How do they feel? Although the health of many leaves much to be desired (frequent headaches and generally not feeling well) they have been forgotten for some reason.

Perhaps some will say that they were carrying out their duty to the Motherland, but such "duty" doesn't happen often. Is it possible that there are so many of them that there is not enough attention and concern for them all? We have a saying that "no one and nothing is forgotten" and yet everything here has been forgotten and the case has been closed.

[Letter from V. I. Perezhogin, Saransk]

A memorial to our soldier-internationalists was unveiled on 29 October 1987 in the city of Saransk in the Mordovian ASSR. Young workers and school students from Saransk's Proletarskiy Rayon erected the memorial at no cost and at an opportune time.

Soldiers who died in Afghanistan were accepted into collectives by brigades from our industrial enterprises and their salaries are being paid into the V. I. Lenin Children's Fund on a monthly basis.

116 soldier-internationalists are on orders from the Proletarskiy Rayon alone.

[Letter from an anonymous serviceman]

The attitude that citizens of Krasnoyarsk have toward soldiers in the Soviet Army has forced me to write.

When you are discharged into that town you hear constant ridicule from behind you, ridicule that is aimed at soldiers and is of the type, "Give up your footwrappings." And after hearing this you even feel guilty about being a soldier. It is certainly unfortunate, but you constantly feel totally inferior in your soldier's blouse. After this you generally have no desire to be in town.

If only this had been an isolated occurrence, but literally everyone has had occasion to run into this.

Maybe this is associated with the fact that there was no war here. This land did not suffer the impact of bombs and shells. The attitude toward soldiers is totally different in places where every forth person perished during the war.

[Letter from an individual who asked that her name not be published]

It is appropriate that you called the soldiers "boys." There is not enough of that maternal view and pain in all other publications about Afghanistan.

If I could, I would give these boys unlimited opportunity to express themselves in the newspaper, on televisions and on the radio. It is our duty to hear them out. We have lulled ourselves with the incantation "it is the grief of others." How can that be! Lads are dying and are crippled and who knows about it? "Their aged mothers?"

Why are we being silent and making this war only their war and the misfortune only their misfortune? It must be shared by everyone. And otherwise we, all the others, are unscrupulous, immoral people.

My son is serving in the Union. I am not complaining about that, but about the fact that my soul is sick about all the other boys.

I am afraid of Afghanistan. I felt that I was a bad citizen and so suffered pangs of conscience. I felt that I was the only one, for my son had been a difficult delivery and I alone knew what it had cost me to raise this healthy genius lad from that puny creature. But at the call-up point I saw other parents with those same insane eyes.

We all saw our sons off to the front. Of course, we did not know where our children would end up, but we did know that there is a war where people are being killed.

See how society is split: this is your affair and your misfortune, your trouble and, it turns out, your war. And a peaceful cloud hangs over all the others.

I watched one pattern develop as I discussed your article with co-workers. Those whose sons had as yet not served

paid more attention than those whose sons had already served (of course, not in Afghanistan) and those without sons.

How sad it is that the lads feel uneasy about wearing their awards! The hush-up has led to this level of absurdity! I am very afraid that the moral charge that the lads bring into society when they return from there is gradually being extinguished. We have many experts in putting things out.

I did not save my son from Afghanistan, but if he had ended up there I would have set out after him. There is nothing else I could have done. He has a duty to the Motherland and I have a duty to him.

[Letter from Nadezhda Nikolayevna Kuzmina, Lenin-gradskaya Oblast]

I am raising three sons and the oldest will enter the army in three years. Until now I thought that if he were fated to serve in Afghanistan, of course I would be upset for him, but also proud that he had been given the honor of defending the borders of our Motherland and carrying out his international duty. But I now think otherwise.

We now have a picture of how our lads are serving in Afghanistan. We could have avoided many deaths if we had immediately thought first and foremost about quality and not numerical strength.

I think (and my husband shares this opinion) that we should send the best trained lads to Afghanistan. Let them go through a year of training in the army and, better still, in the Assault Forces and then send the best trained to Afghanistan in their second year. This is so that they know how to shoot very well, really know the techniques and generally know all the fine points of military equipment.

[Letter from Yevgeniy Yevgenyevich Lobanov, Chelyabinsk]

Thank you for the truth about the war. I am saying this as a former soldier, although I did not fight in Afghanistan. I served in those krays and in the Turkestan Military District from 1974 to 1976 and I know how difficult it is to live in the desert, even when not fighting.

I myself fired my automatic weapon three times during my two years of service and have no understanding of how to deploy on-line or how to employ the methods of hand-to-hand fighting and it is very distressing to note that there have been no changes for the better in the army.

I served in Uzbekistan, that bread-basket, and imagine, we ate dehydrated potatoes. And this while serving amidst grapes, melons, apples and so forth. It was only after the lieutenant general who commanded district aviation visited us that we saw that we were actually serving in Uzbekistan. Tomatoes, pickles and so forth showed up on the table... and this was in 1976.

I am a worker, 31 years old.